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Abstract
It should be no surprise that Department of Defense (DoD) and U.S. Air Force
(USAF) networks are the target of constant attack. As a result, network defense
remains a high priority for cyber warriors. On the technical side, trust issues for a
comprehensive end-to-end network defense solution are abundant and involve multiple
layers of complexity. The Air Force Research Labs (AFRL) is currently investigat-
ing the feasibility of a holistic approach to network defense, called Cybercraft. We
envision Cybercraft to be trusted computer entities that cooperate with other Cyber-
craft to provide autonomous and responsive network defense services. A top research
goal related to Cybercraft centers around how we may examine and ultimately prove
features related to this root of trust.
In this work, we investigate use-case scenarios for Cybercraft operation with a
view towards analyzing and expressing trust requirements inherent in the environ-
ment. Based on a limited subset of functional requirements for Cybercraft in terms of
their role, we consider how current trust models may be used to answer various ques-
tions of trust between components. We characterize generic model components that
assist in answering questions regarding Cybercraft trust and pose relevant comparison
criteria as evaluation points for various (existing) trust models. The contribution of
this research is a framework for comparing trust models that are applicable to similar
network-based architectures. Ultimately, we provide a reference evaluation framework
for how (current and future) trust models may be developed or integrated into the
Cybercraft architecture.
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Developing a Reference Framework
for Cybercraft Trust Evaluation
I. Introduction
The world is in the middle of the information age with almost anything easilyaccessible through the Internet. Attackers are everywhere exploiting this wealth
of information and targeting U.S. military information systems. Working towards
combating these new threats, the USAF redefined its mission in 2005 to include
cyberspace - “deliver sovereign options for the defense of the United States of America
and its global interests - to fly and fight in Air, Space, and Cyberspace.” [9] The
strategic vision for Cyberspace as a warfighting domain was furthered by Secretary of
the Air Force Michael W. Wynne when he announced the creation of the Cyberspace
Command (AFCYBER) [13]. Focusing on science and technology issues related to
this domain, AFRL launched a research initiative geared to prepare for defense in this
critical realm of cyberspace, termed Cybercraft. Just as aircraft platforms operate in
air and carry a wide variety of payloads (bombs, missiles, electronic warfare pods,
precision guided munitions), the term Cybercraft reflects the idea of generic platforms
operating in cyberspace and executing a wide variety of payloads (patch verification,
router configuration information, INFOCON policy enforcement, etc.).
The likely Cybercraft architecture consists of a machine-installed platform that
executes mission-specific payloads: the platform represents a trusted component that
provides command, control, and communication of cyber capabilities on host nodes
while the payloads inherit trust from the platform and carry out various defensive
missions and goals. Network defenders will use this architecture to accomplish specific
tasks via single or multiple cooperating Cybercraft payloads. The architecture will
incorporate hybrid trusted hardware/software/firmware components in various levels
of interaction to support desired functionalities such as intrusion detection, anti-virus
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monitoring, network defense, and so forth. Cybercraft may eventually be deployed on
up to one million nodes in order to provide commanders with a root of trust related
to their high level strategic and operational network defense needs.
1.1 Research Motivation
1.1.1 Goals. The ability to model, measure, and verify the degree of trust a
commander may place in Cybercraft remains a crucial research question that must be
adequately characterized before this future architecture becomes a reality. Although
trust itself has a multitude of meanings, in this work we consider how to synthesize and
express the nature of trust in the future Cybercraft environment based on expected
operational requirements. We further characterize generic model components that
will help answer questions regarding Cybercraft trust and pose relevant comparison
criteria as evaluation points for various (existing) trust models. We also introduce a
novel approach to synthesize trust relationships iteratively based on use case analysis,
attack tree threat modeling and operational/mission level task breakdown.
1.2 Research Contribution
1.2.1 Requirements. We provide a unique and revolutionary approach to
requirements definition based on: use case analysis, attack/defense trees and mission
level task breakdown. Attack trees are a way to visualize attacks on our networks as
well as possible defense approaches to these attacks. A use case is typically described
as a text-based step-by-step breakdown of the interaction between a user and a system.
Mission level task breakdown is the process of splitting a high level goal into smaller,
more manageable pieces. Our initial set of requirements helps further the goal of
creating a Cybercraft prototype.
1.2.2 Reference Framework for Trust Evaluation. Our contribution to the
area of trust is creating a way to characterize generic model components to establish
trust boundaries within the Cybercraft domain. Given specific requirements specifi-
cation, we derive attributes and desired properties of trust models which articulate,
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express, and evaluate commanders trust. We provide specific correlation between
abstract trust models and the Cybercraft trust problem related to specific system re-
quirements. Furthermore, we implement and analyze specific models to demonstrate
the utility of trust expression within the context of Cybercraft. Given three specific
trust models (hTrust, VTrust, P2P), we illustrate and analyze the nature of transitive
trust decisions reflected by components of the Cybercraft architecture. Finally, we
define a reference framework for evaluating existing and future trust models as well
as provide specific measures for analyzing transitive trust relationships in view of the
Cybercraft platform and its root of trust.
1.3 Thesis Organization
This document is divided into seven chapters. Chapter II presents Cybercraft
and trust issues in greater detail. Chapter III presents our approach to requirements
gathering using attack/defense trees, use cases and mission level task breakdown.
Chapter IV characterizes the trust models and further explains how to evaluate them.
Chapter V sets up the scenarios. Chapter VI walks through and analyzes the results
and Chapter VII summarizes our contributions and give recommendations for future
work.
Thesis Statement: This research examines the trust relationships throughout
the Cybercraft architecture and develops a clear way of gathering requirements by
using attack trees, use cases and mission level task breakdown.
Results: This research creates an initial set of requirements for the Cybercraft
Domain (Chapter III, Section 3.3). These requirements, along with three trust models
(hTrust, VTrust, P2P), create a reference framework for Cybercraft trust evaluation.
Analysis of the three trust models concludes no model rises above another and, as is,
none are suitable for potential use within the Cybercraft architecture.
This research first creates an initial set of requirements for the Cybercraft do-
main (Chapter III, Section 3.3). Next, we create a referece framework for trust
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model evaluation with possible application to Cybercraft. Three models in particular
(hTrust, VTrust, P2P) were evaluated to create the reference framework (Chapter VI,
Section 6.3). Our analysis of the three models concludes that none, in their current
state, are applicable for Cybercraft. Using the reference framework as a guide for
trust model requirements, a combination of the best attributes of the three models is
a possibility.
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II. Related Work
Defining trust is elusive as no one definition rises above another. One of thereasons is that trust is more of a social issue as opposed to the technical view
many in the research community have.
Although trust is used everywhere, Gollmann argues that just using the word
(trust) in a system or project is dangerous because of its manifold and sometimes
contradictory meanings [10]. It is an overloaded term that hinders the clarity and
precision that is sought after in technical fields. Nonetheless, it expresses a quality
that military commanders make quite frequently: an objective dependability (whether
by mathematical proof or demonstrated testing) that a system will perform according
to its specifications, even though negative consequences can occur. Next, we dis-
cuss the specific ideas of trust that apply to Cybercraft in context to the envisioned
architecture.
2.1 Trust
Many authors have attempted to define trust. Gambetta [8] laid the founda-
tion for the definition of trust as a social concept that is subjective and context-
dependent. Cahill [4] elaborated further to add attributes such as self-preserving and
self-amplifying, among others. In more general terms, trust is defined as the measure
of trustworthiness that relies on whatever evidence is provided or implied [3]. Trust
plays a key role in system development and we consider it an essential concept.
To understand trust, many look at and try to mimic human trust [4, 5] and
consider three main delineations: initial trust, trust evolution, and trust delegation.
Initial trust is the first formation of trust between two entities and usually happens
through recommendations from other trusted entities. Trust evolution is the contin-
uation and self-adaptation of trust over time and allows for experience to affect the
trust relationship. Trust delegation occurs when an entity delegates a trust decision
to another trusted entity. In other trust domains [17], different terms express the
same basic concepts: experience (for evolution), knowledge (initial), recommenda-
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tions (delegation). Once we assign a precise meaning and definition for trust, we in
essence form a model which may be exercised and evaluated given the assumptions
and boundaries of our system. It is essential that regardless of the model chosen, the
reason we want to use the model and our expectation of what it will provide must be
clearly defined.
2.2 Transitive Trust
We are especially interested in the idea of transitive trust for application to
Cybercraft. The goal is to have many Cybercraft working together in the same envi-
ronment to accomplish a set of goals. There will be times when Cybercraft A must
trust Cybercraft B with a trust decision on whether or not to interact with Cyber-
craft C. In a more general sense, two entities can have varying degrees of trust in
each other, within a specific context. An entity can trust an individual in multiple
contexts as well, each having a different value of trust. We can express transitive trust
as the resulting measure between an entity A and entity C based on the assumption
that entity A trusts entity B and entity B trusts entity C. Our interest in transitivity
permeates a basic desire for Cybercraft: the ability to take a locality of guaranteed
trust (established through hardware) and extend that trust to the execution of code
(via payloads) so that the resulting effects, collected data, sensing information, and
network operations are trusted as well. The other aspect of trust we must consider
deals with the multi-agent communication and cooperation needs that become evident
when considering a typical Cybercraft application involving multiple payloads oper-
ating across multiple platforms. Both of these application contexts have ramifications
for Cybercraft and our desire to express and measure commander-level trust.
2.3 Cybercraft
Phister et al. [15] pose the first conceptual use of Cybercraft as an autonomous,
intelligent agent that accomplishes military purposes across a wide variety of electronic-
based media. Envisioned as a cyber-vehicle that traverses through cyberspace, Cy-
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bercraft were seen as the future platform by which military operations would be
conducted in the cyber realm. AFRL enhanced these ideas [2] and developed plat-
form/payload architecture with certain target qualities. The Cybercraft platform,
for example, requires a long service life with large investment to support a variety
of missions and will be the subject of intense scrutiny to characterize attribution,
authentication, and reliability. The Cybercraft payload, likewise, supports rapid de-
velopment cycles, provides extensibility, and implements specific effects related to
defensive missions. The long service life of the platform allows for trust to be formed,
maintained, and reevaluated on a constant basis. As research has progressed, trust
and a self-protection guarantee for Cybercraft have emerged as a coherent study
area [11,14].
We can use a domain model to describe various relationships between entities
in a system. Figure 2.1 illustrates a rudimentary domain model for Cybercraft that
illustrates several concepts pertinent to trust expression and security. First of all, the
platform has a one-to-many relationship with prospective nodes, meaning that one
platform will be deployed per node and nodes represent a wide variety of IP-based
appliances such as workstations, routers, hand-held devices, or servers. Currently,
Cybercraft platforms will execute payloads to achieve or accomplish specific effects
and goals in support of operational/tactical missions. Platforms may communicate
with other platforms or allow inter-payload communication to accomplish their tasks.
Platforms (and thus payloads) may also use other tools or processes (virus checkers,
IDS, etc.), depending on the level of trust such tools may have. Though the entire
cyber environment is not represented, we can still visualize that nodes are connected
to other nodes via networks and are ultimately controlled by some underlying op-
erating system (OS). The specific relationship between the Cybercraft platform and
a deployment node is still under consideration, but the current direction assumes a
mixture of hardware and firmware that is independent of normal architectural layout.
The tentative domain model in Figure 2.1 reflects the complexity of the trust
evaluation process. Payloads are seen to inherit trust from the Cybercraft platform
7
Figure 2.1: Conceptual Domain model for Cybercraft.
and each association represents a possible trust decision that requires evaluation.
There will have to be an initial trust value for a Cybercraft to trust the machine it
is loaded to. Computer networks are constantly changing and so as time goes on,
trust evolution and delegation will need to be addressed. As this domain model is
conceptual and by no means as extensive and complex as the Cybercraft domain,
it illustrates the need for a way to measure trust between all the interacting parts.
Thompson [20] demonstrated through a series of examples that it was impossible to
trust any code unless personally written. AFRL has an Anti-Tamper program, Soft-
ware Protection Initiative (AT/SPI) whose mission is ”to prevent the unauthorized
distribution and exploitation of application software critical to national security” [1].
Combining these techniques with trust model exploration will only enhance the goal
of trusted relationships for the Cybercraft architecture.
2.4 Establishing a Root of Trust
We define a fundamental aspect of trust in Cybercraft as the ability for a system
to behave as designed and intended. The notion of a root of trust based on hardware
that cannot change is not new - and in fact has been a prized goal for organizations
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such as the Trusted Computing Group (TCG) for quite some time [21]. TCG spec-
ifications provide a starting point for an open set of security related building blocks
that will associate trust with all aspects of computing to include storage, network-
ing, software, mobile devices, personal computers, and servers. Two serious concerns
for trusted computing standards such as those sponsored by TCG include the notion
that competition may be stifled or that manufacturers may implement their “trusted”
components incorrectly. In the context of Cybercraft, the former concern is not an
issue as the military environment provides the operational bounds and the latter con-
cern would need to be addressed adequately with any proposed Cybercraft platform
solution. Nonetheless, the movement towards implementable and procurable secure
hardware solutions in the commercial market provides perfect overlap with Cybercraft
goals to integrate such technology.
We may liken trust establishment in hardware, software, or even the network
itself to the establishment of trust with a service organization. TCG propose the use
of silicon-based components such as the Trusted Platform Module (TPM) as a source
of trusted storage where keys or passwords may be stored. At a minimum, we require
a boot-time process to ensure secure configuration of all further system activity in
order for the Cybercraft platform to establish the root of trust. We need to find trust
models to capture this Cybercraft aspect and models which exercise further transi-
tive relationships past the platform. Candidate trust models should also address the
possibility of physical compromise (capture and subjection of hardware/software to
adversarial activity) for either the platform or any possible payload. TCG already
distinguishes different roots of trust including measurement, storage, and reporting,
which find close corollary to proposed parts of the Cybercraft platform. In the trusted
computed realm, we consider attestation as the processes for guaranteeing the accu-
racy of information and the ability of a platform to vouch for the trustworthiness of
another platform. Attestation also provides a parallel notion for a major perceived
computing paradigm supported by the Cybercraft architecture involving multi-agent
cooperation between payloads accomplishing common tasks and goals.
9
The root of trust established in hardware for the Cybercraft platform gives us
the basis for analyzing transitive trust decisions and gives us a framework to analyze
possible trust models. In order to address how we may integrate these models into
the development for Cybercraft, we begin with our approach for capturing functional
and non-functional requirements, which we discuss next.
2.5 Cybercraft Requirements Distillation
One of the first steps in creating software is defining what it will be used for,
in other words, requirements. Current practices for software development include the
use of an iterative approach which assumes change and relies heavily on feedback, this
is the Object Oriented Analysis and Design (OOA/D) and Iterative Development pro-
cess. We apply the Iterative Development [12] as a model by which we can perform
iterative analysis and design for the Cybercraft architecture while collectively identi-
fying and refining requirements. While some aspects of the future Cybercraft vision
may still be in the realm of research and development, the basic requirements for the
system derive from a desire to provide comprehensive network defense services in a
holistic and secure manner. The requirements for such a system are enormous to say
the least and in order to know where to start, we begin with a general understanding
of network defense missions as they are currently conducted. However, in order to
capture the needs of a future system versus the closed context of current systems, we
seek to define the network defense role from a general application perspective. To ac-
complish this task we use distinct techniques in conjunction: attack/defense trees [6]
and use cases [12].
2.5.1 Attack / Defense Trees. If we had free reign to design a holistic
approach to network security, based on an extensible architecture that uses mission-
specific co-operating payloads, we may best discover the possible tasks of the payloads
by looking first at the possible ways our network is attacked. Attack trees provide a
textual and visual means to analyze such attacks upon a system and are useful tools to
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reason about system security. Figure 2 shows an example attack tree where the root
node is the attackers goal and the children nodes show means or ways the attacker
could accomplish an attack goal. The tree may have AND nodes which mean all child
nodes must be successful to achieve the main goal. Trees use OR nodes to represent
that only one of its child nodes need to succeed for its path to be successful [6].
Once we exhaustively consider how our networks may be attacked and document
those in the form of attack trees, we can then know best what a network defense
architecture should be doing in response. For Cybercraft, we apply this approach
iteratively by taking specific attacks and creating defense trees in response. Defense
trees outline the possible mitigating actions we may take in response. The defense
tree corresponds to the leaf nodes of the attack tree and provides us a task’ level
understanding of what needs to be done. The root node is the attackers goal and the
children nodes are means or ways the attacker could accomplish that goal. Figure 2.2
illustrates an example attack tree as dotted lines and in this case shows that a DDoS
attack may be defended against using firewall/switch/router ACLs or an intrusion
detection system (IDS). Figure 2.3 shows the difference between and AND and an
OR node. Though very high level and general in this example, we envision such
attack/defense tree modeling will provide a root level of understanding for possible
Cybercraft tasks.
Once attack/defense trees are developed, we take some small starting number
of trees/branches (our most important roles for example). We then analyze whether
those defensive roles are currently being done by a human, an existing tool, or both.
In some cases, there may be no (effective) current method that mitigates, detects, or
prevents certain attacks. This analysis method gives us a basis to determine whether
we want the Cybercraft platform/payload architecture to do a particular task, do a
current task better, or possibly automate an existing human-driven process. This
process gives us the chance to not only analyze how well (or not) we currently do
network defense, but also gives us the ability to look into future requirements without
limitation of what currently is possible.
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Figure 2.2: Attack tree created for an attack on network infrastructure.
Figure 2.3: Attack tree demonstrating and AND and OR node.
2.5.2 Use Cases. Once we determine defensive roles that are applicable
to Cybercraft, we utilize a standard means for capturing software requirements for
those roles: use cases. Use cases are textual means of describing the step-by-step
interaction between a user and a system. In the case of Cybercraft, we expect that text
stories, diagrams, and models will help us determine not only functional requirements
for payloads, but also non-functional requirements related to command and control,
visualization, and policy development. Because use cases are software methodology
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agnostic, they provide an ideal means to communicate requirements between users,
analysts, and designers. Use cases provide a concrete means to further determine the
nature and number of payloads that support a given defensive role or mission. They
also provide the ideal means to analyze the impact of transitive trust relationships in
a concrete manner.
Not only do Cybercraft requirements need to address how we intend to perform
network defense, they also need to uniformly address all possible avenues of vulnera-
bility. We see the nature of the trust question most clearly in this context as it forces
us to consider possible ways in which the actual Cybercraft may itself be subverted.
We use scenarios, dependencies, and any implementation assumptions as part
of the analysis process to help identify trust expressions (or questions) that should be
evaluated or answered. To aid in this process, we also apply the art of misuse cases to
the normal use case process. Misuse cases are simply step-by-step descriptions that
detail adversarial action and records how the system (should or should not) respond
accordingly. We expect this analysis to directly feed our requirements for trust model
expression and exercise.
The general template of a use case is shown in Table 2.1. For most of the
requirements, we will use brief use cases and thus have only line describing the action.
2.6 Trust Models
In order to address the issue of self protection and trust, we consider the unique
aspects of the Cybercraft architecture that need trust model expression and that are
revealed as part of the requirements analysis process. We consider several models
such as hTrust [5], VTrust [16, 17], and P2P [22]. hTrust , mimics the interactions
of humans trust and works well in mobile settings because of the minimal resource
demands. VTtrust , is a vector-based trust model. Trust interactions are represented
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Table 2.1: Use case template [12].
Use Case Section Comment
Use Case Name Start with a verb
Scope The system under design
Level user-goal or sub-function
Primary Actor Calls on the system to deliver services
Stakeholders and Interests Who cares about this use case, and what do
they want?
Preconditions What must be true on start, and worth
telling the reader?
Success Guarantee What must be true on successful completion,
and worth telling the reader?
Main Success Scenario A typical, unconditional happy path scenario
of success
Extensions Alternate scenarios of success or failure
Special Requirements Related non-functional requirements
Technology and Data Variations List Varying I/O methods and data formats
Frequency of Occurrence Influences investigation, testing, and timing
of implementation
Miscellaneous Such as open issues
as relational entities translated to a central database. Peer-to-peer is a trust model
applied to peer-to-peer systems.
For each trust model, there are three components of trust: initial trust, trust
exchange, and trust evolution. Initial trust is the first formation of trust between
two agents. Trust exchange deals with the protocols and exchange of trust between
agents. Trust evolution is the continuation of trust over time. This allows for the
decay of knowledge that happens over time. Each trust model uses various words for
each of these trust ideas but essentially mean the same thing. Table 2.2 shows each
model with their terms.
2.6.1 hTrust. hTrust [5] is made up of three main parts: trust formation,
trust dissemination, and trust evolution. Trust formation is the initial trust before
an interaction occurs; creating a trusting environment that gives us a prediction of
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Table 2.2: A summary of similar trust ideas for each trust model
Trust Model Initial Trust Trust Exchange Trust Evolution
hTrust formation dissemination evolution
VTRUST knowledge experience recommended
P2P ratings generation ratings discovery ratings aggregation
trustworthiness. Trust dissemination uses a recommendation exchange protocol to
exchange trust opinions. The evolution of trust is the part that allows for a continuous
self-adaptation of trust.
2.6.1.1 Trust Formation. Trust formation is the initial trust before
an interaction occurs; creating a trusting environment that gives us a prediction of
trustworthiness. To create the initial trust between two agents (say agents a and b),
the aggregated trust information, recommendations, and trust formation function Υ
are all used.
The aggregated trust information is made up of a set of tuples, as shown in
equation 2.1.
[a, b, l, s, c, k, t] (2.1)
It is read as agent a trusts agent b at level l to do service s in context c. The trust
level l is a real value in the range of [-1,1], -1 being total distrust and 1 blind trust.
The degree of knowledge k allows for the distinction from unknown and dont trust
and ranges from [0,1] with 0 unknown and 1 perfect knowledge. Direct experiences
between agents increase the value of k. The last item, t, is a timestamp that allows
for the fact that knowledge decays with time.
Recommendations follow the same format as the aggregated trusted information
tuple with the addition of the recommenders private key. They are used to form initial
trust opinions and delegation, such as relying on third-party assessments. The format
is shown in equation 2.2
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[a, b, l, k, t]SKx (2.2)
The trust formation function Υ will return a predicted trust value or range to
base trust opinions upon and is used to predict the trustworthiness of a trustee.
2.6.1.2 Trust Dissemination. Trust dissemination uses a recommen-
dation exchange protocol to exchange trust opinions. Each agent carries a portfolio
of credentials in their local environment. A portfolio consists of a set of letters rep-
resenting the history of the agent. The letter is a tuple, following the same format
as recommendations. Agent a will form a trust opinion about agent b by using the
protocol. Below are the steps.
1. Agent a sends agent b a request for b’s portfolio of credentials
2. Agent b replies with a set of at most m letters of presentation
3. Trust formation function Υ forms a trust opinion about agent b based on the
information from the letters
4. Interaction between agents a and b may or may not take place depending on
the resulting trust value from trust formation function Υ
2.6.1.3 Trust Evolution. The evolution of trust is a fundamental con-
cept of any TMF and allows for a continuous self-adaptation of trust. The customizing
functions used for trust evolution are the aggregated function Φ and the tacit infor-
mation extraction function Ψ . Trust evolution also plays a role in catching malicious
agents.
The aggregation function Φ maintains information about the trustworthiness of
an agent as a service provider and is used to update the perceived trustworthiness of
trustee b when new direct experiences occur. The extraction function Ψ maintains
information about the trustworthiness of an agent as a recommender and is the sub-
jective part of the TMF. Recommendations are given different weight values using
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the extraction function and are based on how much trust we have in the agent the
recommendation came from.
Malicious agents will send bad information, spreading fake good recommen-
dations and fake bad recommendations. To help guard against this, a boundary
trustworthiness value η ∈ [-1,1] is defined for each agent so that when an agents
trustworthiness drops below η, the agent becomes suspect. When an agent becomes
suspect, all recommendations coming from that agent are discarded.
2.6.2 VTrust. The trust relationship in VTrust [16, 17] consists of a vector
with three components: experience, knowledge, and recommendation. Experience is
the number of events two agents share within a certain timeframe. Knowledge is
composed of direct knowledge and indirect knowledge. A recommendation uses a
recommendation value as its basis for trust. As well, neutrality is acceptable in this
model. Stevens [19] considers the application of trust vectors and their applicability
for Cybercraft fitness. Their analysis examines the use of Cybercraft payloads in
multi-agent information gathering roles where agents may have to evaluate informa-
tion from other agents. Such roles cover a large number of defense applications where
network sensing data are analyzed. Their conclusions show that a modified Trust
Vector model could meet the needs for expressing trust decay and transitive trust
decisions in the information retrieval context.
The trust relationship is calculated from three numeric values represented as a
decimal ranging from [-1, 1] ∪ ⊥. A negative value represents trust-negative, a positive
value represents trust-positive and a zero value is trust-neutral. Lack of value from
insufficient data is given by ⊥. This trust relationship is shown in equation 2.3
(A →c B)t = [AEcB,A KcB,ψ RcB] (2.3)
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Experience is the number of events two agents share within a certain timeframe.
An event can be trust positive, trust negative, or trust neutral. Recent events are
given more weight.
Knowledge is composed of direct knowledge and indirect knowledge. Each com-
ponent of the trust model (experience, knowledge, and recommendation) is given two
values; one to represent direct and the other indirect knowledge. The knowledge pol-
icy computes the weight these values are given. Knowledge is gathered by summing
of the product of the two knowledge values.
A recommendation uses a recommendation value as its basis for trust. An agent
uses the level of trust ([-1,1]) to provide a weighed recommendation. This weight
multiplied with the former value will return the recommendation score for an agent.
The VTrust model allows for two agents coming up with different trust values
from the same input. This can happen when an agent gives different weight values
for each trust component (experience, knowledge, recommendation).
2.6.3 P2P. In peer-to-peer (P2P) systems, peers interact with unknown
peers without trusted third-parties. In P2P systems there is a frequent join and leave
of peers. Yu, et al. [22] present a distributed approach for P2P systems using repu-
tation mechanism for trust. Their approach uses polling algorithms and deals with
dishonest or unlreliable peers. Peers can be thought of as agents (from the previ-
ous models discussed). There are three reputation mechanisms: ratings generation,
ratings discovery, and ratings aggregation. Each are discussed below.
2.6.3.1 Ratings Generation. Ratings generation focuses on how to
aggregate ratings and is represented an interval from [0,1]. There are two different
types of ratings: service (reliability) and voting (credibility). Tying these words into
the other models, service is a service specific trust opinion and voting is a recommen-
dation trust opinion. A peer Pi wanting to evaluate the trustworthiness of peer Pj
has two options: using direct experience and recommendations. Direct experience is
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interaction between the two peers and recommendations come from others in the case
where Pi and Pj have no frequent interactions.
The two different types of ratings are local rating and aggregate rating. Local
rating is based on direct interaction and is generated every time an interaction takes
place between two peers, such as Pi and Pj. Aggregate rating combines the local
ratings (if there are any) with recommendations from other witnesses. This is used to
decide whether peer Pj is trustworthy and whether peer Pi will propagate the ratings
to others.
Reputation mechanisms, or aggregate ratings, help establish trust between peers
but direct interaction, or local rating, has more weight in the decision for Pi to trust
Pj. In the case that Pi and Pj have not interacted (no local ratings), if enough
recommendations have been received, interaction will occur.
2.6.3.2 Ratings Discovery. Ratings discovery uses the process of refer-
rals to find witnesses in an efficient manner. If a witness is found, the response is sent
in the reverse path of the request. A series of referrals makes a referral chain. This
can be thought of as transitive trust or chain trust, one of the key ides for Cybercraft.
The referral chain creates a trust graph that is kept in the peers’ local environment.
2.6.3.3 Ratings Aggregation. There needs to be a way to distinguish
between reliable and deceptive or unreliable peers. Witnesses may not give true
information about other peers. This is called noisy ratings and has three variations:
complementary, exaggerated positive, and exaggerated negative. Malicious peers are
either individual or in a colluding group. Weighted majority techniques are used to
predict the trustworthiness of a given party. A peer will maintain a weight for the
credibility of each peer it requests a testimony from that gives an estimate of how
credible the peer thinks the witness is.
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2.7 Summary
Our goal for this research is to further the process of requirements gathering
using the tools of attack/defense trees and use/misuse cases. We discussed in this
chapter the basic ideas of trust, along with the need for transitive trust representation
for Cybercraft. Then we discussed the Cybercraft domain and what that entails
thusfar. Finally, we gave an overview of three trust models that have the potential
to be applied to Cybercraft to give a value to trust relationships. The next chapter
uses the tools to generate requirements for Cybercraft and Chapter IV goes over the
three trust models in greater detail.
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III. Cybercraft Requirements Development
Requirements’ gathering is a daunting, but needed task, especially for the ideasand goals for Cybercraft. As mentioned in Chapter II, use cases and attack and
defense trees are used to flesh out some functional and non-functional requirements.
Using a strategic-operational-tactical view, we create probable Cybercraft missions
and/or payloads from each of the defense priorities. This chapter is laid out as
follows. The next section starts the process for hashing out requirements, followed
by a couple of examples of expanded use cases, and finally the chapter closes with a
summary of Cybercraft requirements.
3.1 Requirements gathering
Using the top ten defensive priorities1, we compile a list of brief use cases using
a strategic-operational-tactical mission level breakdown process. The defense priori-
ties expanded on are: attack detection, automated network vulnerability mitigation,
automated attack interdiction, network attack damage assessment, automated attack
reporting, and adversary identification 2. Use cases were created for each of these
defense priorities using a mision level task breakdown and are shown in Appendix A.
3.1.1 Attack Detection. The first defense priority is attack detection. The
ability to detect an attack before, during, or after, is crucial to keeping our networks
secure. USAF networks are constantly under attack and our network defenders must
be able to respond quickly.
Many items from can be implemented into a Cybercraft mission. Creating logs,
maintaining password policies, monitoring IP addresses, and monitoring ports are all
good candidates to become Cybercraft payloads or missions. The other items listed
could possibly still be done with Cybercraft payloads, but would need more of a
breakdown and thought put into them.
1Air Force ACC IO RAWG 2006
2This work was accomplished with the help of Mr. Lou Giannelli, Contractor, USAF ACC 83
NOS Det 3/SCN, Lead Network Defender
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With these use cases, we can create numerous attack/defense trees. Taking a
specific attack, a Code Red buffer overflow, we create a defense tree shown in Figure
3.1. The corresponding attack tree is shown in Figure 3.2. A Code Red buffer overflow
attack attempts to connect to TCP port 80, and once connected, sends a GET request
to exploit a buffer overflow 3.
Figure 3.1: A defense tree for detecting a Code Red buffer overflow attack.
3retrieved from http://www.cert.org/advisories/CA-2001-19.html
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Figure 3.2: An attack tree for a Code Red buffer overflow attack.
A defense tree is useful in determining what is being done now with current
tools, processes, or by human. Currently, traffic validation is done by tools and by
network defenders. There is no way to specify a list for a Cybercraft to look for all the
vulnerabilities and many are found by human analysis and piecing things together.
However, a Cybercraft could be tasked to isolate a specific network or workstation.
This could enhance the speed with which vulnerabilities can be exploited and the
window of vulnerability is drastically reduced. Finally, it is possible for a Cybercraft
to implement forensic guidelines if they were scrutinized.
Referencing the Code Red attack tree, there are certain generalizations. First,
a Cybercraft could dispatch a payload with AV software to detect these types of
known attacks. As well, Cybercraft could be more dynamic and react faster than AV
software if it is always running. AV software is supposed to detect known signatures
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of attacks, but only when it is running. A Cybercraft could be placed specifically to
detect these types of attacks 24/7.
3.1.2 Automated Network Vulnerability Mitigation. The second defense pri-
ority we use is automated network vulnerability mitigation. Although it is impossible
to automate human analysis, we can try to automate tasks that are repetitive and
require searching for specific known items.
Anything that requires monitoring or collecting data can be automated and are
potential for Cybercraft payloads. A payload could be used to parse data for specific
items of “interest”. These items would have to be enumerated by network defender
SME’s (subject matter expert). A point needs to be maide here that it is difficult to
automate the analysis of collected data. The ability of human analysis and interaction
cannot be replaced by any tool, no matter what it boasts.
Checking vulnerabilities is a good area for Cybercraft. A baseline of param-
eters can be set and a Cybercraft can notify the operator when a change occurrs.
An example is ensuring current USAF network policies are followed. Enforcing these
policies is another possible Cybercraft mission. TCNO’s (Time Compliance Network
Order), TCTO’s (Time Compliance Technical Order), and AFI’s (Air Force Instruc-
tions) contain many of these policies and procedures and can also be used to hash
out possible Cybercraft missions and payloads. The specifics of these documents are
beyond the scope of this thesis and will be published as an area of future research.
Automated patching is currently being done on USAF networks with Microsoft c©
SMS (System Management Server). There are many issues with the implementation
of SMS on USAF networks. Because of the varied networks and programs that are
mission essential that need specific OS’s there is often a large exemption list. An
exemption list includes workstations and possibly even entire networks exempt from
the automatic pushing of patches from SMS. This exemption list creates numerous
vulnerabilities on the network. This is where Cybercraft can come in. It has the
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potential to create new software or enhance the old not so functional software to
actually be beneficial and help ensure security for the network.
3.1.3 Automated Attack Interdiction. The next defense priority we use
is automated attack interdiction. We can’t stop enemies from trying to attack our
networks, but we can work to interdict and reflect the attacks. The use cases created
for this defense priority are shown in Appendix A.3.
If a device becomes suspect, a Cybercraft will be able to isolate the device in a
more timely and efficient manner and mitigate further devices from becoming suspect
than current tools and processes. This greatly enhances security for our networks as
we can respond at the speed of the network instead of at human speed. We envision
Cybercraft to be an autonomous agent, and thus be able to adapt to what is happening
to the network.
The corresponding attack and defense trees created for SQL inject attack are
shown in Figures 3.3 and 3.4 respectively. Figure 3.3, the defense tree, shows a
general sequence of events for detecting and mitigating a SQL injection attack. This
particular case is mainly done with analysis from network defenders. A possible
Cybercraft mission for this scenario is blocking the IP segments. A Cybercraft could
accomplish this much faster than the human process.
The attack tree, Figure 3.4, steps through a possible sequence an attacker could
use to accomplish a SQL inject attack. The main goal if this attack is to gain access
to unauthorized information by taking advantage of unfiltered user input. To protect
against these attacks, user input must be filtered and always checked before blindly
being used by the program.
3.1.4 Network Attack Damage Assessment. The next defense priority we
use is network attack damage assessment. It’s important to know the who, what,
when, where, and why of an attack, or at least as much information as you can. As
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Figure 3.3: A defense tree for detecting a SQL Inject attack.
the old saying goes, keep your enemies closer than your friends. The use cases created
for this defense priority are shown in Appendix A.4.
Standard desktop is a goal for USAF leaders that all workstations have the
same look and feel to them. At first glance, this would make security easier, but there
are always exceptions and keeping up with exceptions or an exemption list is always
hard to do. An exemption list means manually updating and patching. Since one of
the goals is to have a Cybercraft installed on every machine, it could take control of
keeping the computer up-to-date.
Currently, the HP Openview suite of network management products is used to
monitor and report on the health of the network. We do not envision Cybercraft to
take over all the responsibilities of network defense, as there are plenty of current
software/hardware solutions already in place (such as HP Openview). The goal of
Cybercraft is to supplement these current tools to enhance network security and
ensure we are protecting ourselves adequately.
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Figure 3.4: An attack tree for a SQL Intect attack.
3.1.5 Automated Attack Reporting. The next defense priority we use is
automated attack reporting. As well as knowing the who and why, it’s important to
keep track of items for future analysis to detect patterns. The use cases created for
this defense priority are shown in Appendix A.5.
Tracking incidents gives us documentation to compare and find patterns an
enemy is using. It will be difficult to place a specific role to Cybercraft for this
use case as this is mostly a network defender analysis role. If there is anything to
automate, Cybercraft would be a prime candidate.
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3.1.6 Adversary Identification. The last defense priority we use is adversary
identification. Going along with the last two defense priorities, knowing who your
enemies are is extremely important. The use cases created for this defense priority
are shown in Table A.6.
These use cases go hand-in-hand with the previous section. Along with anlayzing
data and detecting patterns, finding out the source of the attacks is very important.
Knowing what your enemy is up to can help predict a future attack and thus help
us prepare for the future predicted event far better than not knowing anything in
advance.
3.2 Expanded Use Cases
Our first scenario deals with anti-virus (AV) software and ensuring proper con-
figuration on all workstations on a network. We go through the scenario in Table 3.1.
Our next scenario deals with the firewall software and ensuring proper configuration.
We go through the scenario in Table 3.2. These are only two examples of hashing
out details and figuring out where we can use Cybercraft and deploy their payloads.
Ideally, we would create fully-dressed use cases for all the brief use cases mentioned
in this chapter. This is an area of future work.
3.3 Summary of Cybercraft Requirements
It is important to enumerate requirements of Cybercraft. We need to know
what we are expecting them to do before trying to implement anything. Below is a
summary of suggestions.
• Ensure secure condition on the node using integrity check
• Supplement SMS
• Port monitoring
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Table 3.1: Use case for ensuring AV is installed and up-to-date.
Use Case Name AV
Scope The network
Level Ensure AV software is installed and up-to-date on all
machines
Primary Actor Cybercraft
Stakeholders and Interests Network Defenders
Preconditions Network is operational, up-to-date,
Success Guarantee All machines have AV software loaded, operational, and
up-to-date
Main Success Scenario Cybercraft platform creates a payload to check AV soft-
ware on all machines in the network, if all machines have
operational AV that is up-to-date, the scenario is suc-
cessful
Extensions Cybercraft platform creates a payload to check AV soft-
ware on all machines in the network. Alternate scenar-
ios:
1. If there is no AV software, the Cybercraft platform
dispatches another payload to install AV software
on the machine in question
2. If there is AV software installed, but not updated,
the Cybercraft platform dispatches another pay-
load to obtain correct updates from approved sites
Frequency of Occurrence Daily
Miscellaneous Assumptions are that the Cybercraft payload and plat-
forms are trusted, the network is secure, all channels a
Cybercraft uses are secure
• Network monitoring
• Anomaly detection, send an alert if out of the ordinary
• Flagging an alert on outbound traffic when certain conditions are met
• Enforce TCNO/TCTO, AFI network operating procedures
• Parse raw data transcripts to help base technicians locate key elements 4
4For more information on this bullet, refer to Appendix B
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Table 3.2: Use case for ensuring firewall is installed and up-to-date.
Use Case Name Firewall
Scope The network
Level Ensure firewall software is installed and up-to-date
Primary Actor Cybercraft
Stakeholders and Interests Network Defenders
Preconditions Network is operational, up-to-date,
Success Guarantee All boundary devices have a firewall that is operational,
and up-to-date
Main Success Scenario Cybercraft platform creates a payload to ensure firewall
is installed. If up-to-date and configured properly, the
scenario is successful
Extensions Cybercraft platform creates a payload to check the sta-
tus of the firewall. Alternate scenarios:
1. If there is no firewall, the Cybercraft platform dis-
patches another payload to install a new firewall
2. If there is a firewall installed, but not updated, the
Cybercraft platform dispatches another payload to
obtain correct updates from approved sites and in-
stall them, if any
Frequency of Occurrence Daily
Miscellaneous Assumptions are that the Cybercraft payload and plat-
forms are trusted, the network is secure, all channels a
Cybercraft uses are secure
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IV. Trust Model Setup
For Cybercraft, we need a model to capture not only the subjectability of trust,but the decision making, learning, and obeying aspects as well [7]. The decision
making process allows for trust delegation and when this should occur. Cybercraft
must know who is friendly to be able to interact and learn information from and be
able to delegate all authority and obey another with confidence. This chapter explains
each trust model in greater detail, examining the underlying mathematics that make
the models work.
4.1 hTrust
hTrust has three trust values: trust formation, trust dissemination, and trust
evolution (reference Chapter II). Stevens states [18] all Cybercraft platforms will go
through a formal verification but not all payloads will. Therefore, one can conclude
that certain payloads will have vastly different trust values. For reference, trust
information is kept as a set of tuples, shown below in Equation 4.1.
[a, b, l, s, c, k, t] (4.1)
The minimized tuple shown in Equation 4.2 is referenced henceforth and is read
agent a trusts agent b at level l , knowledge k at time t . l represents the level agent a
has in agent b and is represented as a range from [-1,1]. k is the degree of knowledge,
in other words, how much agent a knows about agent b, and is represented as a range
from [0,1].
[a, b, l, k, t] (4.2)
Trust formation and trust dissemination use trust formation function Υ. The
trust evolution phase uses the two other functions: the aggregation function Φ and
the tacit information extraction function Ψ.
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4.1.1 Trust Formation Function Υ. Equation 4.3 is the mapping of Equation
4.4. Υop is a trust prediction (range from [-1,1]) based on one trust opinion (or tuple).
O is the set of all trust opinions whereas ε is the set of all environments. Thus, Υop ,
shown in Equation 4.3 is read as the set of tuples in O map to the environment ε, in
the range [-1,1].
Equation 4.4 calculates the trust range using l , k , and t from a tuple. T and
η are parameters from the agents local environment. T is the time interval trust
information is gathered and η is a boundary value and agents aren’t trusted if their
trust opinions fall below η. Equation 4.4 is run on each tuple to achieve a trust value
range.
Υop : O → ε → [−1, 1]× [−1, 1] (4.3)
Υop[a, b, l, k, t]e = [max(−1, l− | l − f |), min(l+ | l − f |, 1)] (4.4)
f = l ∗ k ∗max
(
0,
T − (tnow − t)
T
)
(4.5)
Another range is calculated (Equation 4.7) from a set of m recommendations
received. Equations 4.8, 4.9 and 4.10 are used in Equation 4.7.
Υrec : ℘(O) → ε → [−1, 1]× [−1, 1] (4.6)
Υrec[{oi | i ∈ [1,m]}]e = [llow, lhigh] (4.7)
llow =
∑
i{π1(Υop[oi]e) ∗ qi | qi > η}∑
i(qi | qi > η)
, lhigh =
∑
i{π2(Υop[oi]e) ∗ qi | qi > η}∑
i(qi | qi > η)
(4.8)
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π1(l1, l2) = l1, π2(l1, l2) = l2 (4.9)
qi = max(η, l
′
i ∗ k
′
i ∗max
(
0,
T − (tnow − t′i)
T
)
) (4.10)
Equation 4.11 is the mapping of trust formation function Υ. The set of all
tuples O crossed with the set of all recommendations ℘(O) maps to the environment
ε which produces the result of a trust value range from [-1,1] × [-1,1].
Υ : O × ℘(O) → ε → [−1, 1]× [−1, 1] (4.11)
Υ[(o,O)]e = h1(Υop[(o)]e, Υrec[O]e) (4.12)
The customizing function, h1 (Equation 4.13), is applied to the range produced
from the function Υ and the final result is a prediction of trustworthiness between
two agents a and b. The application chooses a value from this range to use as a trust
prediction.
h1 = ([l1, l2], [l
′
1, l
′
2]) =[h2([l1, l2])− | h2([l1, l2])− h2([l
′
1, l
′
2]) |,
h2([l1, l2])+ | h2([l1, l2])− h2([l′1, l
′
2]) |]
(4.13)
h2(l1, l2) = w1 ∗ l1 + w2 ∗ l2 (4.14)
4.1.2 Aggregation Function Φ. The aggregation function Φ is used to update
an agent’s local environment when a new direct experience occurs. It is composed of
three equations. The first equation (4.15), shows the mapping. A range from [-1,1]
crossed with the set of all recommendations maps to the environment.
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Φ : [−1, 1]× ℘(O) → ε (4.15)
Equation 4.16 is the first of two formal definitions for aggregated function Φ.
It describes the case where agent a’s local environment is updated from a new direct
experience with agent b. Customizing function, h4 (Equation 4.19), combines the
three trust opinions (agent a’s old trust opinion about agent b, the trust opinion just
received about agent b from the new experience, and the newly updated trust opinion
using the new recommendations) to create the new trust opinion a will carry about b
in its local environment.
Weights are used in Equation 4.19 to weight the different values of l. l1 is the
trustworthiness of b from the recent interaction, l2 is the opinion previously held by a
and l3 is b’s expected trust value based on the recent experience. Depending on which
one is valued over the other will determine the value of each weight. For example, if
I have a friend for many years whom I place a lot of trust in and a recent experience
with her is not good, her previous experience with me will weigh more than the most
recent experience. Tying this example to Equation 4.19, w1 = 1, w2 = 0, and w3 =
0 to say that I trust past experiences more than most recent and perceived from the
most recent. But, if I only recently met this same friend, the most recent experience
is going to weigh more because there isn’t much past data to compare against. Thus,
w1 = 1, w2 = 1, and w3 = 0 which will change trust opinions fairly quickly because
we are taking into account two of the three trust opinions.
Φ[l̃, O]e = e \{[a, b, l, k, t]} ∪ {[a, b, l′ , k′ , t′ ]} | o = lookup(b, e) = [a, b, l, k, t]
∧ l′ = h4(l̃, l, h2(Υrec[O]e)) ∧ k′ = min(k + kmin, 1) ∧ t′ = tnow
(4.16)
The second definition of aggregated function Φ is Equation 4.17. Equation 4.17
considers the case where a trust opinion updates soley based on recommendations and
no interaction between agents a and b occured. This trust opinion is calculated from
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l (old trust opinion from a) and h2(Υrec[O]e). k is not updated as knowledge is only
received from direct experiences 5.
Φ[ε,O]e = e \{[a, b, l, k, t]} ∪ {[a, b, l′ , k′ , t′ ]} | o = lookup(b, e) = [a, b, l, k, t] ∧
l
′
= h4(ε, l, h2(Υrec[O]e)) ∧ k′ = k ∧ t′ = max(t, max({πtime(oi), oi ∈ O}))
(4.17)
h3 : [−1, 1]× [−1, 1] → {−1, 1} (4.18)
h4(l1, l2, l3) =
w1 ∗ l1 + w2 ∗ l2 + w3 ∗ l3
w1 + w2 + w3
(4.19)
4.1.3 Tacit Information Extraction Function Ψ. The tacit information ex-
traction function Ψ is used to weigh recommendations differently when an agent must
make a trust decision with no previous direct experiences and can only rely on recom-
mendations. For example, agent a might have a higher trust value for agent b than
agent c and thus agent b will have a higher weight value placed on his recommenda-
tions.
Equation 4.15 is the mapping of tacit information extraction function. A range
from [-1,1] crossed with the set of all recommendations maps to the environment and
the new value then maps to the environment.
Ψ : [−1, 1]× ℘(O) → ε → ε (4.20)
The Trust Management Framework (TMF) maintains a set of tuples for each
agent as a recommender, which is referred to as tacit information. The tacit in-
formation extraction function Ψ updates this information after an interaction using
5If the knowledge component is able to be transitively updated in this equation, chain trust will
work for this model. Reference the results in Chapter VI
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Equation 4.21. The tacit information tuple is updated based upon the perceived trust-
worthiness of a recent interaction between agents a and b and the recommendation
about b from a recommender.
Ψ[l̃, O]e = e \{ri = lookup(i, e) = [a, i, li, ki, ti],∀oi ∈ O} ∪ {r
′
i = [a, i, l
′
i, k
′
i, ti], ∀oi ∈ O} |
k
′
i = min(ki + kmin, 1) ∧ l
′
i =



max(−1, h5(li, δli)) if δli > δmax
min(h5(li, δli), 1) if δli ≤ δmax
,
δli =| l
′ − h2(li− | πl(oi)− πl(oi) ∗ T − (tnow − ti)
T
|,
li+ | πl(oi)− πl(oi) ∗ T − (tnow − ti)
T
|) |
(4.21)
The customizing Function h5 (4.22), creates a new trust value l
′
i based on the
agents past trustworthiness and a discrepancy. If the discrepancy of opinions is lower
than the tolerance parameter, then trustworthiness is increased. If the discrepancy is
higher, the trustworthiness is decreased. Another possibility is weighing the past and
the new recommendation equally, thus the last equation (where n is not a factor at
all). The tolerance parameter decides what an agent will select for a recommender.
The lower the tolerance, the more restrictive the agent is in selecting recommenders.
h5 : li =
n ∗ li + 2−δli2
n + 1
, OR li =
n ∗ li − 2−δli2
n + 1
,
OR li =
li +
2−δli
2
n + 1
, where n =
ki
kmin
(4.22)
Table 4.1 is an agents local environment. T represents the time interval when
interactions are observed. tnow is the current time the trust value is calculated. t is
the trust value from the tuple being used to calculate the trust opinion and η is a
boundary value in the range of [-1,1] that represents the cutoff of whether an agent
trusts another agent below a certain value.
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Table 4.1: Agent a ′s Local Environment [5].
Data
Aggregated Trust Information [a, x , l , k , t ]
Tacit Information [a, x , l , k , t ]
Portfolio of Credentials [x, a, l, k, t]SKx
Parameters
Time Interval of Relevant Observations T
Maximum Tolerate Discrepancy of Opinions δmax
Single Increment of Knowledge kmin
Minimum Trust Level η
Customizing Functions
Given two trust ranges, compute a trust
range (used by Υ)
h1
Given a trust range, compute a trust opinion
(used by Υ)
h2
Given a trust range, decide whether the pre-
diction is precise enough (used by the recom-
mendations exchange protocol)
h3
Given three trust opinions, compute a new
one (used by Φ)
h4
Given a trust opinion and a discrepancy,
compute a new trust opinion (used by Ψ)
h5
4.2 VTrust
VTrust is composed of three components: experience, knowledge, and recom-
mendation. Equation 4.23 represents the vector. AE
c
B is the magnitude of A’s ex-
perience about B in context c, AK
c
B is A’s knowledge and ΨR
c
B is the affect of B ’s
recommendations to A. Each of these three values fall in a range from [-1,1] ∪ ⊥
where no knowledge is represented by ⊥.
(A → B)t = [AEcB,A KcB,Ψ RcB] (4.23)
4.2.1 Experience. Experience is the number of events between two agents
A and B within a specific time frame [t0, tn]. Steven’s work [18, 19] concluded that
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keeping between 9 to 10 intervals is sufficient for Cybercraft, depending on storage
and how much granularity is needed. Equation 4.24 gives the value for experience .
wi is a non-negative weight and Ii is the sum of all values of events (trust-positive,
trust-negative, trust-neutral).
AE
c
B =
∑n
i=1 wiIi∑n
i=1 ni
(4.24)
wi =
i
S
, where S =
n(n + 1)
2
(4.25)
4.2.2 Knowledge. The knowledge component is composed of two parts:
direct knowledge and indirect knowledge. Equation 4.26 gives the knowledge compo-
nent. d and r are in the range [-1,1] ∪{⊥}, represent direct and indirect knowledge,
respectively, and wd + wr = 1.
AK
c
B =



d, ifr =⊥
r, ifd =⊥
wd · d + wr · r, ifd 6=⊥, r 6=⊥
⊥, ifd = r =⊥
(4.26)
4.2.3 Recommendation. The recommendation is calculated using a rec-
ommendation value and the level of trust the agent has in the recommender. The
recommendation value represents the level of trust an agent A has for a recommender
agent B. The equation for a recommendation is 4.27.
ΨR
c
B =
∑n
j=1(v(A → j)Nt ) · Vj∑n
j=1(v(A → j)Nt )
(4.27)
Ψ is a group of n recommenders and v(A → j)Nt is a trust value from the jth
recommender and Vj is the recommender’s recommendation value.
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4.2.4 Normalization Policy. The normalization policy takes into affect the
different weights a trustor may assign during trust evaluation. It is represented as a
vector and the breakdown is displayed in Equation 4.28. Trust changes and decays
with time and thus Equation 4.29 represents the time affected vector.
(A → B)Nt = W ¯ (A → B)t
= [We,Wk,Wr]¯ [AEcB,A KcB,Ψ RcB]
= [We ·A EcB, Wk ·A KcB,Wr ·Ψ RcB]
= [AÊ
c
B,A K̂
c
B,Ψ R̂
c
B]
(4.28)
(A → B)Ntn =



[AÊcB,A K̂
c
B,Ψ R̂
c
B] if tn = 0
[v(T̂ )3 ,
v(T̂ )
3 ,
v(T̂ )
3 ] if tn 6= 0 and AÊcB =A K̂cB =Ψ R̂cB =⊥
α · [AÊcB,A K̂cB,Ψ R̂cB] + β · [v(T̂ )3 , v(T̂ )3 , v(T̂ )3 ]
if tn 6= 0 and at least one of
AÊ
c
B,A K̂
c
B,Ψ R̂
c
B 6= ⊥
(4.29)
Trust values are calculated using Equation 4.30.
v(A → B)Nt =A ÊcB +A K̂cB +Ψ R̂cB (4.30)
4.3 P2P
P2P’s three main components are: ratings generation, ratings discovery, and
ratings aggregation.
4.3.1 Ratings Generation. The two types of ratings are local and aggregate
ratings. Local ratings are a series of probabilistic ratings Sij = {s1ij, s2ij, . . . , shij}, 0 ≤
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skij ≤ 1, h is bounded by the allowed history H. Therefore the local rating can be
obtained by using simple averaging or exponential averaging. Equation 4.31 shows
the simple averaging and Equation 4.32 shows exponential averaging. Aggregate
ratings combine the local ratings with those of any witnesses (recommenders). This
rating determines trustworthiness. The equations for aggregate ratings are shown in
Equations 4.25 and 4.34.
Equation 4.31 adds up all the ratings from 0 to h and divides by the total
number, h to get an average value.
R(Pi, Pj) =



∑h
k=1 sij/h h 6= 0
0 h = 0
(4.31)
For Equation 4.32, γ determines the weights given to the most recent observa-
tions. γ ranges from (0 < γ < 1) and the larger the value the faster past observations
are forgotten. The difference between the two occurs when there are malicious peers
and simple averaging will give a value under the true value.
R(Pi, Pj) =



γ[shij + . . . + (1− γ)hs1ij] h 6= 0
0 h = 0
(4.32)
Pi uses Equation 4.25 to get an aggregate rating value about Pj. {W1, . . . , WL}
are a group of witnesses for peer Pj and R(Wk, Pj) is the local rating. wk is a weight
assigned to testify against the credibility of the recommender (witness). P , Equation
4.33, is a prediction from all the testimonies used to calculate the aggregate rating
towards peer Pj, Equation 4.34.
P =



∑L
k=1 wk ∗R(Wk, Pj)/L L 6= 0
0.5 L = 0
(4.33)
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η is peer Pi’s confidence in its local rating about peer Pj where η = h/H and L
is the number of witnesses Pi found. When Pj is new, the trust rating is 0.5 because
it was found that it is more advantageous to trust new peers in a p2p system as there
aren’t many malicious peers.
T (Pi, Pj) =



ηR(Pi, Pj) + (1− η)P L 6= 0
0.5 L = 0
(4.34)
4.3.2 Ratings Discovery. Ratings discovery uses a trust graph to get referrals
from other peers. The trust graph (Pr, Pg,P,R) is a directed graph composed of
referral chains of Pr requesting information on Pg. P is a set of peers {P1, . . . , Pn}
and R is a set of referrals {r1, . . . , rn}. An example trust graph is shown in Figure
4.1.
Figure 4.1: An example of a trust graph from [22].
P0 is trying to evaluate the trustworthiness of P8. P4 and P7 are witnesses (or
recommenders) for P8. The requesting peer is black, queried peers are gray, and those
that have not been queried are white.
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4.3.3 Ratings Aggregation. Ratings aggregation deals with incorrect ratings,
noisy ratings, that distort the true ratings of peers. Equation 4.35 defines the three
types of noisy ratings: complementary, exaggerated positive and exaggerated negative.
α ranges from (0 < α < 1) and represents the exaggerated coefficient, s is the true
rating and s
′
is the distorted rating. Equation 4.36 allows for the weighting of different
witnesses, depending on how much a peer trusts another.
s
′
=



1− s complementary
α + s− αs exaggerated positive
s− αs/(1− α) exaggerated negative
(4.35)
θ = 1− (1− β) | R(Wk, Pj)− s | (4.36)
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V. Experimental Methodology
The last chapter walked through gathering some functional and non-functionalrequirements for Cybercraft as well as exploring two use cases used to examine
potential real-life scenarios Cybercraft might be exposed to. Requirements gathering
is now applied to the trust models to give a self-defense guarantee and commander’s
trust evaluation/expression for Cybercraft. To do this, we use three specific trust
models: hTrust, VTrust and P2P. The trust models give a mathematical approach
to gauge the trustworthiness of interacting entities and allow for precisely evaluating
security assumptions, attacks, and risks within the Cybercraft architecture. A math-
ematical approach gives understanding for transitive trust and root of trust questions
specific to Cybercraft missions.
The focus of this chapter is to set up two scenarios for Cybercraft architecture
exploration. The first scenario deals with transitive and root of trust questions and
the second scenario uses the first use case of updating anti-virus software from Chap-
ter III to analyze and investigate trust relationships for a potential real-life scenario
for Cybercraft. The goal of these scenarios is to define the trust relationships within
the Cybercraft domain (reference Figure 2.1). Defining these relationships will help
establish what type of model is needed to give value to the trust relationships ex-
pressed in Cybercraft. For each scenario, there is an initial set of dummy values to
create and populate the trust management framework for the trust models. An area
for future research is defining the separate components that make up the Cybercraft
domain and placing appropriate values to each. In the Cybercraft domain model, the
lines represent a trust value. This trust value is created with trust models. The two
scenarios are set up with three trust models: hTrust, VTrust, and P2P.
Certain characteristics must be true in order for us to use a trust model. A
model should be able to form, maintain, and evolve trust opinions between entities.
Quality of service (QoS) requirements are essential as they decide whether interaction
or transactions will take place between interacting entities. There might not be a
globally available infrastructure to interact with and a model should account for this
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as well. Interacting entities should be dynamic and anonymous. Finally, a model
should incorporate human trust decision, be subjective and highly customizable.
The rest of the chapter is laid out as follows. Scenario one is discussed first in
section 5.1, followed by scenario two in section 5.2.
5.1 Scenario One: Transitive Trust Between Entities
The goal of this scenario is to find out how far transitive trust can go. An
example is a → b → c → d → e which is read a trusts b who trusts c who trusts d
who trusts e and therefore a trusts e. We want to see how far this trust chain can go
before it falls apart. Next we walk through each trust model and how to set up all
the values and formulas for this scenario.
There are two types of transitive trust: agent to agent (which Stevens did [18]
and the root of trust. The root of trust is the one we are most interested in. We want
to know if the root of trust in the Cybercraft, or was it the OS, transfers to other
parts of the system.
5.1.1 hTrust. For hTrust, we have to set up each agents local environment.
Table 5.1 represents the local environment for all agents a - e.
5.1.2 VTrust. For VTrust, we only use the recommendation component for
scenario one. The values of experience and knowledge do not count as the weight to
create the normalized vectors cancels them out. We break down this scenario into
several cases. Case one will use the initial data setup shown in Table 5.3. Recom-
mendation values are set to 0.9 and steady throughout a chain of 26 agents.
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Table 5.1: Local Environment in scenario one - hTrust.
b’s data c’s data d’s data
Aggregated Trust In-
formation
[b, a, 0.3, 0.3, 4] [c, b, 0.3, 0.3, 4] [d, c, 0.3, 0.3, 4]
[b, c, 0.3, 0.3, 4] [c, d, 0.3, 0.3, 4] [d, e, 0.3, 0.3, 4]
Tacit Information [b, a, 0.4, 0.3, 4] [c, b, 0.4, 0.3, 4] [d, c, 0.4, 0.3, 4]
[b, c, 0.4, 0.3, 4] [c, d, 0.4, 0.3, 4] [d, e, 0.4, 0.3, 4]
Portfolio of Credentals [a, b, 0.3, 0.3, 4]SKa [b, c, 0.3, 0.3, 4]SKb [c, d, 0.3, 0.3, 4]SKc
[c, b, 0.3, 0.3, 4]SKc [d, c, 0.3, 0.3, 4]SKd [e, d, 0.3, 0.3, 4]SKe
a’s data e’s data
Aggregated Trust In-
formation
[a, b, 0.3, 0.3, 4] [e, d, 0.3, 0.3, 4]
Tacit Information [a, b, 0.4, 0.3, 4] [e, d, 0.4, 0.3, 4]
Portfolio of Creden-
tials
[b, a, 0.3, 0.3, 4]SKb [d, e, 0.3, 0.3, 4]SKd
Table 5.2: Initial parameters for all entities in scenario one - hTrust.
Parameters
T 2 minutes
δmax 0.8
kmin 0.1
η 0
Customizing Functions
h1 (l
′
1, l
′
2)
h2 w1 = 0, w2 = 1
h3 0, if l1 < 0 and l2 > 0
1 otherwise
h4 w1 = 1, w2 = 1, w3 = 0
h5 li =
n∗li+ 2−δli2
n+1
if δli > li
li =
n∗li− 2−δli2
n+1
if δli < li
Table 5.4 are the weights given to each component of the vector (A → B)Nt ,
where We +Wk +Wr = 1. For this experiment, we only consider recommendations as
we are trying to gauge how well VTrust deals with transitive trust and how far down
the chain we can go.
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Table 5.3: Beginning parameters in scenario one, case one - VTrust.
Trustor Initial Recommendation Values
(A → B)Nt 0.9
(B → C)Nt 0.9
(C → D)Nt 0.9
...
...
(X → Y )Nt 0.9
(Y → Z)Nt 0.9
Table 5.4: Weighting of vector values, scenario one - VTrust.
Weight Values
We 0
Wk 0
Wr 1
Stevens thesis [18] proved that going through a chain of 5 agents with a recom-
mendation value of 0.9 for each link (A → B) results in a final trust value of 0.59049.
In the experiments we will test different values to better evaluate what a typical sce-
nario for a Cybercraft will be. Table 5.5 shows the walk through the trust chain and
resulting values.
Table 5.5: Results from chain of 5, scenario one - VTrust.
Recommendation Chain
A → C 0.81
A → D 0.73
A → E 0.6561
A → F 0.59049
Case two puts a little bit more realistic values to start. Table 5.6 shows the initial
values. Each agent represents a part of the Cybercraft domain. Agent A represents
a Cybercraft platform, agent B is a payload, agent C represents an OS, agent D the
network, agent E a different OS, agent F a payload on this separate machine and
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agent G is the locally installed Cybercraft platform. If a payload goes through a
formal verification, it follows that the platform and payload will have complete trust
and knowledge between each other.
Table 5.6: Beginning parameters in scenario one, case two - VTrust.
Trustor Initial Recommendation Values
(A → B)Nt 1.0
(B → C)Nt 0.8
(C → D)Nt 0.2
(D → E)Nt 0.2
(E → F )Nt 0.8
(F → G)Nt 1.0
5.1.3 P2P. The P2P model uses certain assumptions on the system. First,
there are numerous peers entering and leaving all the time and second, malicious
peers are rare in this type of system. For the first scenario, trust chaining, certain
parameters need to be defined and set. Table 5.7 shows the parameters and values
given for this scenario. The bound of referral chain’s length (D, the ** value in the
table) is what is being evaluated in this scenario and thus is not set. The setup is
similar to the two previous models. Peer P1 trusts peer P2 at 0.9, peer P2 trusts P3
at 0.9, and so on. For case two, P2P uses the same values as shown in Table 5.6.
5.2 Scenario Two: Anti-virus Update
Scenario two uses the fully dressed use case from Chapter III, section 3.2, that
deals with AV software. There are three cases: main successful scenario, AV is not
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Table 5.7: Parameters in scenario one - P2P.
Symbol Value Description
h 1 Number of latest interactions
H 10 Bound of allowed history
D ** Bound of referral chain’s length
B 2 Branching factor
α 0.1 Exaggeration coefficient
β 0.5 Constant
γ 0.5 Averaging constant
θ - Update factor in Equation 4.36
η h/H Confidence about local ratings
σi 0.5 Threshold of referral generation
ωi 0.5 Threshold of trust
Table 5.8: Beginning values in scenario one - P2P.
Symbol Value Description
R(W1, P6) 0.9 Local rating of witness W1 for peer P6
wi 1 Weight for the credibility of witness W1
η 0.1 -
installed, and AV is not updated. Each model uses a set of dummy variables to start
with. An assumption we use is payloads cannot talk to each other. They must go
through the Cybercraft platform and the platform will talk to the other payload. The
general agents are defined in Table 5.9.
Table 5.9: General agent setup for all trust models, scenario two.
Agent Value
A Cybercraft platform
B Cybercraft payload check
C Cybercraft payload update
D Cybercraft payload install
E OS
F Network
G AV software on OS (agent E)
H Update place
I AV software from network
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Case one: Cybercraft platform creates a payload, ‘payload check’, to check if
there is AV software loaded on the machine and, if so, is up-to-date. The payload must
interact with the OS to inquire about AV software. The OS queries its applications
and responds to the payload that yes, there is indeed AV software loaded. The payload
then queries the AV software to ensure it is up-to-date. AV software responds that
everything is good to go. Finally, the payload reports back to the Cybercraft platform
that AV software is installed and up-to-date on this particular OS.
Case two: Cybercraft platform creates a payload, ‘payload check’, to check if
there is AV software loaded on the machine, and, if so, is up-to-date. The payload
interacts with the OS to inquire about the AV software. The OS queries its appli-
cations and find there is no AV software loaded and reports these findings back to
the payload. The payload reports to the Cybercraft platform there is no AV software
loaded on this OS. The Cybercraft platform creates a new payload, ‘payload install’,
to go find the AV software. The new payload must interact with the OS and network
to get to the AV software that is on the network. Once the payload gets the AV soft-
ware, it interacts with the OS to install the AV software. Once installed, the payload
(install) reports back to the Cybercraft platform that AV software is installed. The
Cybercraft platform then dispatches the previous payload (check) to ensure the newly
installed AV software is up-to-date. The payload interacts with the OS again to query
the AV software. The AV software responds to the payload everything is up-to-date.
The payload (check) reports to the Cybercraft platform everything is up-to-date for
the AV software on this particular machine OS.
Case three: Cybercraft platform creates a payload, ‘payload check’, to check if
there is AV software loaded on the machine, and, if so, is up-to-date. The payload
interacts with the OS to inquire about the AV software. The OS queries its applica-
tions and responds to the payload there is AV software loaded. The payload queries
the AV software to ensure it is up-to-date. The AV software responds that no, it is
not up-to-date. The payload then reports to the Cybercraft platform that the AV
software loaded on the OS is not up-to-date. The Cybercraft platform creates a new
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payload, ‘payload update’, to update the AV software. The new payload must inter-
act with the OS and network to get to the AV software update on the network. Once
the payload gets the AV update , it interacts with the OS to install the update. Once
the update is installed, the payload (update) reports back to the Cybercraft platform
that AV software is up-to-date.
Certain assumptions were made for this scenario. The first is that all parts
of the system are secure and trustworthy (not malicious). Network, OS, Cybercraft
platform and agent. Next, all trust interactions result in a good trust value. Lastly,
the goal of the scenario is to evaluate the resulting values of trust between each of
the three models.
5.2.1 hTrust. For hTrust, there is an initial set of tuples for the agents that
know about each other. Walking through the cases, we figure out where all those
equations fit in. Each agent wanting to talk to another agent it does not know about
must run the recommendation protocol (reference Chapter II, Section 2.6.1.2), which
uses the trust formation function Υ (Equation 4.12) to create a trust prediction. For
the sake of these cases, we always choose the middle value. After the interaction,
tuples are exchanged between the two agents and each runs the aggregation function
Φ (reference Equation 4.16) to update their tuples in their local environment, if any.
Then, the requesting agent, the trustor, will run the tacit information extraction
function Ψ (reference Equation 4.21) to update the recommendation value of the
agent that recommended the trustee.
The parameters are similar as in scenario one, except a few minor changes,
shown in Table 5.10. The weights for the customizing function, h2 are both 0.5 as
we want to consider trust reflexivity and trust transitivity. Everything else is left the
same as from scenario one. The next sections go through the data setup for each case
in scenario two for hTrust.
The trust values were chosen for each agent as close to what a real scenario
would look like. For example, the Cybercraft platform, agent a, will trust a payload
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explicitly if it has been formally verified and that platform created it. The Cybercraft
payload check (agent b) has a trust level of 1 and knowledge 1, but the Cybercraft
payloads update and install (c and d) have a trust level of 0.5 (knowledge still 1 because
the Cybercraft platform created them) because these payloads will be interacting with
other parts of the system and therefore will have a lower initial trust value. The OS
(agent e) will have full trust and knowledge of items currently installed on it, such as
the AV software (agent g). The OS does not directly correspond with the Cybercraft
platform (agent a), and therefore does not have full trust in it, as well as the network.
Table 5.10: Initial parameters for all entities in scenario two.
Parameters
T 2 minutes
δmax 0.8
kmin 0.1
η 0
Customizing Functions
h1 l
′
1, l
′
2)
h2 w1 = 0.5, w2 = 0.5
h3 0, if l1 < 0 and l2 > 0
1 otherwise
h4 w1 = 1, w2 = 1, w3 = 0
h5 li =
n∗li+ 2−δli2
n+1
if δli > li
li =
n∗li− 2−δli2
n+1
if δli < li
5.2.1.1 Case One. Case one uses agents a, b, e and g. Time starts at
t = 10 at the beginning of the scenario to account for the generation of trust through
time. Table 5.11 shows the local environment of all the agents.
5.2.1.2 Case Two. Case two uses agents a, b, d, e, f and i. Time starts
at t = 10 at the beginning of the scenario to account for the generation of trust
through time. Table 5.12 displays the agents’ local environment.
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Table 5.11: Local environment for scenario two, case one - hTrust.
a’s data e’s data
Aggregated Trust Information [a, b, 1, 1, 10] [e, a, 0.8, 0.8, 10]
[a, e, 0.7, 0.5, 10] [e, g, 1, 1, 10]
Tacit Information [a, b, 0.8, 1, 10] [e, a, 0.8, 0.8, 10]
[a, e, 0.5, 0.5, 10] [e, g, 1, 1, 10]
Portfolio of Credentials [b, a, 1, 1, 10]SKb [a, e, 0.7, 0.5, 10]SKa
[e, a, 0.8, 0.8, 10]SKe [g, e, 1, 1, 10]SKg
b’s data g’s data
Aggregated Trust Information [b, a, 1, 1, 10] [g, e, 1, 1, 10]
Tacit Information [b, a, 1, 1, 10] [g, e, 1, 1, 10]
Portfolio of Credentials [a, b, 1, 1, 10]SKa [e, g, 1, 1, 10]SKe
Table 5.12: Local environment for scenario two, case two - hTrust.
a’s data e’s data f ’s data
Aggregated Trust
Information
[a, b, 1, 1, 10] [e, a, 0.8, 0.8, 10] [f, e, 0.8, 0.8, 10]
[a, d, 0.5, 1, 10] [e, f, 0.8, 0.8, 10] [f, i, 0.8, 0.8, 10]
[a, e, 0.75, 0.5, 10]
Tacit Information [a, b, 0.8, 1, 10] [e, a, 0.8, 0.8, 10] [f, e, 0.8, 0.8, 10]
[a, d, 0.5, 1, 10] [e, f, 0.8, 0.8, 10] [f, i, 0.8, 0.8, 10]
[a, e, 0.5, 0.5, 10]
Portfolio of Cre-
dentials
[b, a, 1, 1, 10]SKb [a, e, 0.7, 0.5, 10]SKa [e, f, 0.8, 0.8, 10]SKe
[d, a, 1, 1, 10]SKd [f, e, 0.8, 0.8, 10]SKf [i, f, 0.8, 0.8, 10]SKi
[e, a, 0.8, 0.8, 10]SKe
b’s data d’s data i’s data
Aggregated Trust
Information
[b, a, 1, 1, 10] [d, a, 1, 1, 10] [i, f, 0.8, 0.8, 10]
Tacit Information [b, a, 1, 1, 10] [d, a, 1, 1, 10] [i, f, 0.8, 0.8, 10]
Portfolio of Cre-
dentials
[a, b, 1, 1, 10]SKa [a, d, 0.5, 1, 10]SKa [f, i, 0.8, 0.8, 10]SKf
5.2.1.3 Case Three. Case three uses agents a, b, c, e, f, g and h. Time
starts at t = 10 at the beginning of the scenario to account for the generation of trust
through time. Table 5.13 is the local environment for the agents.
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Table 5.13: Local environment for scenario two, case three - hTrust.
a’s data e’s data f ’s data
Aggregated Trust
Information
[a, b, 1, 1, 10] [e, a, 0.8, 0.8, 10] [f, e, 0.8, 0.8, 10]
[a, c, 1, 1, 10] [e, f, 0.8, 0.8, 10] [f, h, 0.8, 0.8, 10]
[a, e, 0.7, 0.5, 10] [e, g, 1, 1, 10]
Tacit Information [a, b, 0.8, 1, 10] [e, a, 0.8, 0.8, 10] [f, e, 0.8, 0.8, 10]
[a, c, 0.9, 1, 10] [e, f, 0.8, 0.8, 10] [f, h, 0.8, 0.8, 10]
[a, e, 0.5, 0.5, 10] [e, g, 1, 1, 10]
Portfolio of Cre-
dentials
[b, a, 1, 1, 10]SKb [a, e, 0.7, 0.5, 10]SKa [e, f, 0.8, 0.8, 10]SKe
[c, a, 1, 1, 10]SKc [f, e, 0.8, 0.8, 10]SKf [h, f, 0.8, 0.8, 10]SKh
[e, a, 0.8, 0.8, 10]SKe [g, e, 1, 1, 10]SKg
b’s data c’s data g’s data
Aggregated Trust
Information
[b, a, 1, 1, 10] [c, a, 1, 1, 10] [g, e, 1, 1, 10]
Tacit Information [b, a, 1, 1, 10] [c, a, 1, 1, 10] [g, e, 1, 1, 10]
Portfolio of Cre-
dentials
[a, b, 1, 1, 10]SKa [a, c, 1, 1, 10]SKa [e, g, 1, 1, 10]SKe
h’s data
Aggregated Trust
Information
[h, f, 0.8, 0.8, 10]
Tacit Information [h, f, 0.8, 0.8, 10]
Portfolio of Cre-
dentials
[f, h, 0.8, 0.8, 10]SKf
5.2.2 VTrust. VTrust differs from hTrust in that the trust vectors are not
updated after each interaction, but from a series of events. The experience component
is computed by taking a series of events, broken into time intervals, and giving a weight
value to each set. The time interval set for this case is ti = 2. [t0, t1] represents one
interval. There was no initial setting to the vectors for this scenario. Parameters for
case two are shown in table 5.14.
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Table 5.14: Parameters for VTrust, scenario two.
Parameters
dkw Direct knowledge weight
ikw Indirect knowledge weight
Ew Experience component weight
Kw Knowledge component weight
Rw Recommendation component weight
d Direct knowledge value
r Indirect knowledge value
5.2.2.1 Case One. Case one uses agents A,B, E and G. Time starts
at t = 0 at the beginning of the scenario to account for the generation of trust through
time. Table 5.15 is the local environment for the agents.
Table 5.15: Local environment in scenario two, case one - VTrust.
A’s environment B’s environment
A−B B − A B − E B −G
dkw 1 dkw 1 dkw 0.7 dkw 0.7
ikw 0 ikw 0 ikw 0.3 ikw 0.3
Ew 0.5 Ew 0.5 Ew 0.5 Ew 0.5
Kw 0.5 Kw 0.5 Kw 0.3 Kw 0.3
Rw 0 Rw 0 Rw 0.2 Rw 0.2
d 1 d 0.3 d 0.3 d 1
r 0 r 0 r 0.7 r 0.6
E’s environment G’s environment
E −B E −G G−B G− E
dkw 0.7 dkw 1 dkw 0.7 dkw 1
ikw 0.3 ikw 0 ikw 0.3 ikw 0
Ew 0.5 Ew 0.5 Ew 0.5 Ew 0.5
Kw 0.3 Kw 0.5 Kw 0.3 Kw 0.5
Rw 0.2 Rw 0 Rw 0.2 Rw 0
d 0.3 d 1 d 0.3 d 1
r 0.7 r 0 r 0.7 r 0
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5.2.2.2 Case Two. Case two uses agents A,B, D,E, F and I. Time
starts at t = 0 at the beginning of the scenario to account for the generation of trust
through time. Table 5.16 is the agents’ local environment.
5.2.2.3 Case Three. Case three uses agents A, B, C, E, F, G and H.
Time starts at t = 0 at the beginning of the scenario to account for the generation of
trust through time. Table 5.17 is the local environment of the agents.
Table 5.17: Local environment in scenario two, case three - VTrust.
C’s environment
C − A C − E C − F C −H C −G
dkw 1 dkw 0.7 dkw 0.7 dkw 0.7 dkw 0.7
ikw 0 ikw 0.3 ikw 0.3 ikw 0.3 ikw 0.3
Ew 0.5 Ew 0.5 Ew 0.5 Ew 0.5 Ew 0.5
Kw 0.5 Kw 0.3 Kw 0.3 Kw 0.3 Kw 0.3
Rw 0 Rw 0.2 Rw 0.2 Rw 0.2 Rw 0.2
d 1 d 0.3 d 0.3 d 0.3 d 0.3
r 0 r 0.7 r 0.5 r 0.6 r 0.6
A’s environment B’s environment
A−B A− C B − E B − A B −G
dkw 1 dkw 1 dkw 0.7 dkw 1 dkw 0.7
ikw 0 ikw 0 ikw 0.3 ikw 0 ikw 0.3
Ew 0.5 Ew 0.5 Ew 0.5 Ew 0.5 Ew 0.5
Kw 0.5 Kw 0.5 Kw 0.3 Kw 0.5 Kw 0.3
Rw 0 Rw 0 Rw 0.2 Rw 0 Rw 0.2
continued on next page
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Table 5.16: Local environment in scenario two, case two - VTrust.
A’s environment B’s environment
A−B A−D B − E B − A
dkw 1 dkw 1 dkw 0.7 dkw 1
ikw 0 ikw 0 ikw 0.3 ikw 0
Ew 0.5 Ew 0.5 Ew 0.5 Ew 0.5
Kw 0.5 Kw 0.5 Kw 0.3 Kw 0.5
Rw 0 Rw 0 Rw 0.2 Rw 0
d 1 d 1 d 0.3 d 1
r 0 r 0 r 0.7 r 0
D’s environment
D − A D − E D − F D − I
dkw 1 dkw 0.7 dkw 0.7 dkw 0.7
ikw 0 ikw 0.3 ikw 0.3 ikw 0.3
Ew 0.5 Ew 0.5 Ew 0.5 Ew 0.5
Kw 0.5 Kw 0.3 Kw 0.3 Kw 0.3
Rw 0 Rw 0.2 Rw 0.2 Rw 0.2
d 1 d 0.3 d 0.3 d 0.3
r 0 r 0.7 r 0.5 r 0.6
E’s environment F ’s environment
E −B E −D F −D F − I
dkw 0.7 dkw 0.7 dkw 0.7 dkw 1
ikw 0.3 ikw 0.3 ikw 0.3 ikw 0
Ew 0.5 Ew 0.5 Ew 0.5 Ew 0.5
Kw 0.3 Kw 0.3 Kw 0.3 Kw 0.5
Rw 0.2 Rw 0.2 Rw 0.2 Rw 0
d 0.3 d 0.3 d 0.3 d 1
r 0.7 r 0.7 r 0.8 r 0
I’s environment
I −D I − F
dkw 0.7 dkw 1
ikw 0.3 ikw 0
Ew 0.5 Ew 0.5
Kw 0.3 Kw 0.5
Rw 0.2 Rw 0
d 0.3 d 1
r 0.8 r 0
continued from previous page
d 1 d 1 d 0.3 d 1 d 0.3
continued on next page
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r 0 r 0 r 0.7 r 0 r 0.6
H’s environment F ’s environment
H − C H − F F − E F −H F − C
dkw 0.7 dkw 1 dkw 01 dkw 1 dkw 0.7
ikw 0.3 ikw 0 ikw 0 ikw 0 ikw 0.3
Ew 0.5 Ew 0.5 Ew 0.5 Ew 0.5 Ew 0.5
Kw 0.3 Kw 0.5 Kw 0.5 Kw 0.5 Kw 0.3
Rw 0.2 Rw 0 Rw 0 Rw 0 Rw 0.2
d 0.3 d 1 d 1 d 1 d 0.3
r 0.8 r 0 r 0 r 0 r 0.8
E’s environment
E −B E −G E − C E − F
dkw 0.7 dkw 1 dkw 0.7 dkw 1
ikw 0.3 ikw 0 ikw 0.3 ikw 0
Ew 0.5 Ew 0.5 Ew 0.5 Ew 0.5
Kw 0.3 Kw 0.5 Kw 0.3 Kw 0.5
Rw 0.2 Rw 0 Rw 0.2 Rw 0
d 0.3 d 1 d 0.3 d 1
r 0.7 r 1 r 0.7 r 1
G’s environment
G− E G−B G− C
dkw 01 dkw 0.7 dkw 0.7
ikw 0 ikw 0.3 ikw 0.3
Ew 0.5 Ew 0.5 Ew 0.5
Kw 0.5 Kw 0.3 Kw 0.3
continued on next page
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Rw 0 Rw 0.2 Rw 0.2
d 1 d 0.3 d 0.3
r 0 r 0.7 r 0.7
5.2.3 P2P. The parameters are very similar to those of scenario one. Table
5.18 shows the parameters and values given for this scenario.
Table 5.18: Parameters for the P2P model, scenario one.
Symbol Value Description
β 0.5 Constant
θ - Update factor in Equation 4.36
η .5 Confidence about local ratings
5.2.3.1 Case One. Case one uses agents Pa, Pb, Pe and Pg. Time starts
at t = 0 at the beginning of the scenario to account for the generation of trust through
time. The only initial values of this scenario are the fact that Pa and Pb, and Pe and
Pg have a direct knowledge of 1 for each other.
5.2.3.2 Case Two. Case two uses agents Pa, Pb, Pd, Pe, Pf , and Pi.
Time starts at t = 0 at the beginning of the scenario to account for the generation of
trust through time. The only initial values of this scenario are the fact that Pa and
Pb, Pa and Pd, Pe and Pf , and Pe and Pi have a direct knowledge of 1 for each other.
5.2.3.3 Case Three. Case three uses peers Pa, Pb, Pc, Pe, Pf , Pg and Ph.
Time starts at t = 0 at the beginning of the scenario to account for the generation of
trust through time. The only initial values of this scenario are the fact that Pa and
Pb, Pa and Pc, Pe and Pf , Pf and Ph, and Pe and Pg have a direct knowledge of 1 for
each other.
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VI. Analysis and Results
This chapter covers the results of the scenarios from each of the three models.Scenario one examined two variations of transitive trust: agent to agent and
the root of trust. Scenaro two used the AV use case from chapter III, section 3.2.
Scenario one results are discussed in section 6.1 and scenario two results are discussed
in section 6.2.
6.1 Scenario One: Transitive Trust
6.1.1 Analysis. The two types of transitive trust analyzed are agent to agent
and the root of trust. Stevens [18] work focused mainly on transitive trust between
agents.
6.1.2 Results. We breakout the results of scenario one based on our three
candidate trust models. We discuss hTrust first, then VTrust, and conclude with P2P
analysis.
6.1.2.1 hTrust. The results show that the chain trust from a → b →
c → d → e falls apart after c. hTrust has no transitivity of trust. Agent a receives
a recommendation from b about c and a’s knowledge of c is set to 0. To continue
with the chain, there must be some sort of interaction between a and c for a to have
knowledge about c as a recommender. A way for things to work would be for the
knowledge component to be transitive just as the trust value is. Case two was not
evaluated because of the results from case one.
6.1.2.2 VTrust. For case one, setting all values to 0.9 for recommen-
dations, agent’s A−Z create a chain that, with the range from [0,1], still does not go
to 0. This is an unrealistic scenario as there is a very small chance there will be a set
of agents that have a chain with a recommendation value of 0.9 for every chain. The
results are shown in Figure 6.1 and show that even through 26 agents, the trust value
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is not negative and not quite 0 (0.0646). There is a 0.75 difference in the beginning
value and last trust recommendation.
Figure 6.1: Results for trust chaining agents A− Z - VTrust.
The second case uses more realistic values mapping to a possible Cybercraft
domain and trys to more accurately predict the environment a Cybercraft will be
in. The results, from Figure 6.2, show trust degrades much faster. It only takes
two recommendations before the value drops 0.6 points, which is very significant,
especially within the range ∈ [0,1].
6.1.2.3 P2P. The P2P model shows that there is a high limit (un-
known as of yet) for trust chaining. Because of the way a P2P system is setup, peers
trust until proven otherwise. Therefore the trust chain resulting from peer Pi attempt-
ing to interact with peer Pj, can be very long. Pi uses the witness(es) that attest to
Pj. The chain is used to find these witnesses and nothing more. The witnesses’ (Wk)
local rating for Pj is used, along with a weighting of the trust Pi has in Wk (set to
1 if Pi has never interacted with Wk before) to get a predicted trust value. If this
value is above a certain threshold, ω, then peer Pi will interact with Pj and update
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Figure 6.2: Results for trust chaining agents A−G - VTrust.
its information. For our first scenario, we used a value of 0.9. This yielded a final
trust value of 0.81, with a threshold of 0.5. Therefore, peer Pi will interact with peer
Pj. A summary of the results is shown in Table 6.1. Changing the beginning value
will not affect the resulting trust value in a significant way
Table 6.1: Results from the P2P model, scenario one, case one.
Recommendation Chain Results
P1 → P6 0.81
Case two uses the same values as VTrust in scenario one, case two. Peer P1
wishes to interact with peer P7 and the resulting trust value is 0.05. The reson for
this is because of the value P6 → P7 = 0.1. Thus, peer P1 uses that value as a starting
point. The results are shown in Table 6.2.
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Table 6.2: Results from the P2P model, scenario one, case two.
Recommendation Chain Results
P1 → P6 0.05
6.2 Scenario Two: Anti-virus Update
6.2.1 Analysis. The goal for scenario two was to implement one of the
fully-dressed use cases from Chapter III, specifically the one dealing with AV update.
6.2.2 Results. The results for case one, two and three are shown in Figures
6.3, 6.4 and 6.5. The graph shows the agent interactions on the x-axis. It is read
agent a trusts agent b (a − b). The y-axis is the resulting trust value at the end of
the scenario. The results are similar through all three cases. The numbers are very
similar between each model and agent. The difference comes in where hTrust has a
1 value throughout the entire scenario. hTrust therefore does not allow for the factor
of time decay. The other two models factored that in and thus their numbers are
lower for those agent trust relationships. Another observation is hTrust generally has
a lower trust value for certain agents (ones that didn’t start with a 1 value) than the
other two models VTrust and P2P.
For hTrust, time started at t = 10, increased in increments of 2, and ended at t
= 16. The interactions for case one, in order, were a−b, b−e, e−g, g−e, e−b, b−a.
Agents b− g and e− g did not exchange any sort of recommendations and thus their
tacit information tuples were not updated. The results from show that with somewhat
realistic values, trust will not degrade too fast to a point where the model becomes
useless. A case for future work is to run scenarios adjusting all the parameters (such
as the customizing functions h1 − h4, η, etc.). For case two, time started at t = 10,
increased in increments of 2, and ended at t = 22. The interactions, in order, were
a−b, b−e, e−b, b−a, a−d, d−e, d−f, d−i, i−d, d−e, d−a, a−b, b−i, i−b, b−a.
Agents e− f and f − i did not exchange any sort of recommendations and thus their
tacit information tuples were not updated. For case three time started at t = 10,
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increased in increments of 2, and ended at t = 20. The interactions, in order, were
a− b, b− e, e− g, e− b, b− a, a− c, c− e, c− f, c− h, h− c, c− e, c− a, a− c.
Agents e− g and f − h did not exchange any sort of recommendations and thus their
tacit information tuples were not updated.
VTrust calculates the value of trust over a period of time as opposed to after
each interaction (such as hTrust). For this scenario, all interactions were recorded,
then a final trust value was created. The P2P model calcutes trust values after each
interaction.
Figure 6.3: Results for Scenario Two, Case One.
6.3 Reference Framework
A proponent of hTrust is the various parameters and customizing functions.
These elements allow for a better evaluation of trust. The problem with hTrust is the
model breaks down after only one recommendation. hTrust does not in its current
state allow for the degredation of trust over time. Cybercraft are going to need to have
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Figure 6.4: Results for Scenario Two, Case Two.
Figure 6.5: Results for Scenario Two, Case Three.
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numerous chains. VTrust allows for trust chaining but does not have a framework to
implement the model and seems to be a piecemeal of components to create a value.
P2P allows for a long chain of trust but with the assumption to trust a peer until it is
proven malicious will not work for Cybercraft. The opposite is true, Cybercraft must
be less trusting of new peers. Another thought is P2P only allows for an interval of
[0,1]. This is not adequate to represent a full range of trust values. Recommend a
range of [-1,1] such as that of hTrust.
None of these models taken as-is will work for Cybercraft. With some modifi-
cations, a combination of the best of all three, or even a new model, is a possibility.
Table 6.3: Reference Framework.
hTrust VTrust P2P
Able to form, maintain, and evolve
trust opinions
Yes Yes Yes
Incorporates QoS Yes Yes Yes
Human tailored Yes No No
Subjective Yes Yes Yes
Highly customizable Yes No Yes
Allows for transitive trust No Yes Yes
Dynamic trust changing Yes Yes Yes
Minimal resource demands Yes Yes Yes
Ability to catch malicious agents Yes Yes Yes
Allow for degredation of trust over time No Yes Yes
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VII. Conclusions and Future Work
Trust expression in the Cybercraft domain centers around several key relation-ships: platform to payload, platform to platform, platform to node, and payload
to payload. There are obviously many others to consider. Our continuing work con-
siders which, if any, of the current trust models best express proof that trust transfers
from the root of trust in the payload to other components in the system.
There are many unknowns still to be captured and analyzed for Cybercraft. The
goal for this research effort is not a network defense band aid for USAF networks,
but rather a means to focus thinking about future threats and capabilities. In this
paper, we discuss various means of capturing requirements, specifically using the
software engineering techniques of use cases, threat modeling, and attack trees. As
well, the main research question of trust was discussed. We expound briefly possible
trust models such as hTrust and VTrust that may provide a good fit for Cybercraft.
Future work in this are includes iterative requirements exposition for Cybercraft and
enumeration of trust relationships within the Cybercraft domain.
7.1 Future Work
Cybercraft is a new idea for the future of our network defense and has many
unknowns still. The following section discusses various work that will help further
the goal of implementing Cybercraft to protect our defense networks.
7.1.1 Requirements. TCNO’s and TCTO’s are an excellent source for gath-
ering future requirements. These documents contain the daily guidelines for our
current network and should be used in helping define what our future network will be
like. Another area in requirements gathering is using the brief use cases from chap-
ter III and creating fully-dressed use cases. Once these use cases are created, trust
model application is the next step. Addressing and evaluating the current state of
our network defense is important to ensure we address any deficiencies there might
be.
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7.1.2 Trust. The many components that make up the Cybercraft domain
will have values to represent trust. Future work can decide what value to give a trusted
vendor versus unknown vendors or vendors that did not go through a screening process
(formal verification). As well as vendors, USAF networks extensively use third party
software, such as A/V software, firewall, etc. There needs to be a way to place a value
of trust in these components. Communication lines must be secure and trusted as
well and given a trust value. One idea for placing initial trust values is if the product
offered goes through a formal verification process, then the trust value is 1, if not,
it could be 0 or possibly lower, even to -1. More trust models need to be evaluated
to further define the reference framework for the Cybercraft domain. Evaluating the
models using the same scenarios and adjusting the parameters will help pin down
what values are realistic for those variables.
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Appendix A. Operational-Tactical/Mission Breakdown
The following tables are the result of the requirements analysis from Chapter III.The analysis of these tables are included in Chapter III.
Table A.2 shows the brief use cases created for the defense priority of automated
attack interdiction from Chapter III.
Table A.1: Attack Detection operational-tactical/mission break-
down.
Strategic goal: Attack Detection
Operational Tactical Mission
Detect Insider Threat Monitor access Ensure access is as limited as possible
Ensure a “need to know”
Log individual access to highly sensi-
tive items
Ensure clearances are up-to-date
Examine physical security to devices
(server farm, unattended computers,
wiring closets, etc.)
Maintain password policies
Deactivate access immediately after
termination
Monitor and respond to suspicious be-
havior
Record user access 24X7
Detect physical threat Monitor access Log individual access to highly sensi-
tive items
Examine physical security to devices
(server farm, unattended computers,
wiring closets, etc.)
Detect computer attack Determine source of
attack
Monitor incoming IP addresses
Monitor incoming/outgoing ports
Monitor high activity sources
Detection analysis Detect anomalies Analyze base traffic for XX months
Compare incidents over XX amount of
time
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Table A.2: Automated Network Vulnerability Mitigation operational-
tactical/mission breakdown.
Strategic goal: Automated Network Vulnerability Mitigation
Operational Tactical Mission
Detect and mitigate
Denial of Service
(DDoS) attacks
Monitor collective
network resource
utilization and deny
attempts to usurp
XX% utilization
Monitor CPU historical usage
Monitor server storage growth
Monitor router/switch activity
Monitor/analyze base incoming net-
work activity
Ensure global parameters are set cor-
rectly
Collect and analyze data on network
performance
Monitor overall network status, check
for anomalies
Monitor specific base network status
(i.e., a specific base, unit, or squadron)
Daily/weekly sched-
uled maintenance
Log system crashes
Ensure regular backups are occurring
Use tools to detect configuration
changes
continued on next page
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continued from previous page
Strategic goal: Automated Network Vulnerability Mitigation
Operational Tactical Mission
Ensure all patches are up to date on
routers, switches, workstations, etc.
System defragmentation
Scheduled outage/downtime
Check vulnerabilities Ensure global parameters are set cor-
rectly
Ensure proper configuration of server,
workstation, peripherals, communica-
tions devices, and OS/application soft-
ware
Ensure network redundancy
Ensure ”hot swap” devices are available
Enable router filtering of known DDoS
attacks
Ensure workstations,
network devices are
up-to-date
Automated patching Ensure SMS is enabled
Ensure minimal exemption list
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Table A.3: Automated Attack Interdiction operational-
tactical/mission breakdown.
Strategic goal: Automated Attack Interdiction
Operational Tactical Mission
Detect network attack Detect and mitigate
base external network
resources
Monitor log files
Block specific IP segments attack is
coming from
Ensure router/switch ACL’s are up-to-
date
Cut off from network compromised de-
vices
detect and mitigate
base internal network
resources
Monitor log files
Ensure all patches are up-to-date
Automatic blocking Block ports Start blocking a ”suspect” port when
traffic reaches XX% utilization
Block unused ports
Allow only certain traffic on ports well
known for attacks
Active deception Redirection Redirect to honeypots
Documentation Logs Monitor logs
Detect anomalies
Table A.4: Network Attack Damage Assessment operational-
tactical/mission breakdown.
Strategic goal: Network Attack Damage Assessment
Operational Tactical Mission
Determine network baseline Monitor network Log network traffic for XX months to
create baseline
Create baseline ACL’s for routers and
switches
Implement standard desktop
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Table A.5: Automated Attack Reporting operational-
tactical/mission breakdown.
Strategic goal: Automated Attack Reporting
Operational Tactical Mission
Documentation Track incidents
Table A.6: Adversary Identification operational-tactical/mission
breakdown.
Strategic goal: Adversary Identification
Operational Tactical Mission
Track IP addresses/segments of known
attacks
Analyze logs for trends
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Appendix B. MFR 2008-01-17
This is a MFR from Mr. Lou Giannelli, INOSE East Det 3. We conducted weeklymeetings to hash out some possible Cybercraft missions using attack/defense
trees. This MFR is a result of a few examples Mr. Giannelli brought up during one
of our meetings.
Subject: Cybercraft Suggestions
Submitted by: Lou Giannelli, INOSC East Det 3
Date: 17 Jan, 2008
B.1 Background
As a sub product of the weekly session interaction where Defenders have provided
Capt Hunt with defense and attack tree scenarios, it has become apparent that the
Defenders can also provide suggestions for Cybercraft capabilities. This MFR docu-
ments two suggestions presented to Capt Hunt on today’s session. These suggestions
represent possible solutions to mitigate two recurrent problems.
B.2 Problem 1
Defenders routinely provide base technicians with technical details regarding sus-
picious/malicious network connections. The said details are provided as raw data
transcripts in ASCII format. The average technician customarily is not prepared to
identify key elements necessary to identify and validate questionable connections.
Suggested solution 1. To study the feasibility of enabling Cybercraft with a parsing
subroutine capable of enabling base technicians with a search utility to locate these
key elements in a raw data transcript in ASCII format.
B.3 Problem 2
There are recurrent violations to current AFI and TCNO policy. The violations
originate on base internal users circumventing sercurity policies.
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Suggested solution 2. To study the feasibility of enabling Cybercraft with a logi-
cal subroutine capable of flagging an alert on outbound connections using the listed
services when a set of conditions are met.
This suggestion envisions Cybercraft enabled with a logical subroutine capable of
examining the 3-way handshake sequence on packets with destination port 21, and
a destination IP different than the authorized sites. Cybercraft will flag connections
meeting these criteria with an alert.
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Appendix C. Results
This appendix includes all the results from the scenarios in Chapter VI.
Table C.1: Results from a chain of 26 agents.
Recommendation Chain Results
A → C 0.81 A → M 0.2824 A → W 0.0985
A → D 0.729 A → N 0.2542 A → X 0.0886
A → E 0.6561 A → O 0.2288 A → Y 0.0798
A → F 0.59059 A → P 0.2059 A → Z 0.0718
A → G 0.5314 A → Q 0.1853
A → H 0.4783 A → R 0.1668
A → I 0.4305 A → S 0.1501
A → J 0.3874 A → T 0.1351
A → K 0.3487 A → U 0.1216
A → L 0.3138 A → V 0.1094
Table C.2: Results from a more realistic Cybercraft environment.
Recommendation Chain Results
A → C 0.80
A → D 0.16
A → E 0.032
A → F 0.0256
A → G 0.0256
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Table C.3: Final Data for scenario two, case one - hTrust.
a’s data
Aggregated Trust Information [a, b, 1, 1, 16]
Tacit Information [a, b, 1, 1, 10]
Portfolio of Credentials [b, a, 1, 1, 16]SKb
b’s data
Aggregated Trust Information [b, a, 1, 1, 16]
[b, e, 0.34, 0.1, 12]
[b, g, 0.25, 0.1, 14]
Tacit Information [b, a, 1, 0.97, 12]
[b, e, 0.83, 0.1, 14]
Portfolio of Credentials [a, b, 1, 1, 16]SKa
[e, b, 0.4, 0.1, 12]SKe
[g, b, 0.4, 0.1, 14]SKg
e’s data
Aggregated Trust Information [e, g, 1, 1, 12]
[e, b, 0.4, 0.1, 12]
Tacit Information [e, g, 0.97, 1, 12]
Portfolio of Credentials [g, e, 1, 1, 12]SKg
[b, e, 0.34, 0.1, 12]SKb
g’s data
Aggregated Trust Information [g, e, 0.97, 1, 12]
[g, b, 0.4, 0.1, 14]
Tacit Information [g, e, 1, 1, 12]
Portfolio of Credentials [e, g, 1, 1, 10]SKe
[b, g, 0.25, 0.1, 14]SKb
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Table C.4: Final Data for scenario two, case two - hTrust.
a’s data b’s data d’s data
Aggregated Trust Informa-
tion
[a, b, 1, 1, 22] [b, a, 1, 1, 22] [d, a, 1, 1, 20]
[a, d, 0.65, 1, 20] [b, e, 0.34, 0.1, 12] [d, e, 0.34, 0.2, 18]
[b, i, 0.13, 0.1, 22] [d, i, 0.25, 0.1, 18]
[d, f, 0.25, 0.1, 16]
Tacit Information [a, b, 1, 1, 10] [b, a, 0.97, 1, 12] [d, a, 0.99, 1, 14]
[a, d, 0.5, 1, 10] [d, e, 0.75, 0.1, 16]
[d, e, 0.75, 0.1, 18]
Portfolio of Credentials [b, a, 1, 1, 22]SKb [a, b, 1, 1, 22]SKa [a, d, 0.65, 1, 20]SKa
[d, a, 1, 1, 20]SKd [e, b, 0.4, 0.1, 12]SKe [e, d, 0.4, 0.2, 18]SKe
[i, b, 0.4, 0.1, 22]SKi [i, d, 0.4, 0.1, 18]SKi
[f, d, 0.4, 0.1, 16]SKf
e’s data f ’s data i’s data
Aggregated Trust Informa-
tion
[e, b, 0.4, 0.1, 12] [f, d, 0.4, 0.1, 16] [i, b, 0.4, 0.1, 12]
[e, d, 0.4, 0.2, 18] [i, d, 0.4, 0.1, 18]
[e, i, 0.25, 0.1, 18] [i, e, 0.4, 0.1, 18]
Tacit Information [e, g, 0.97, 1, 12] [f, e, 1, 1, 12]
Portfolio of Credentials [b, e, 0.34, 0.1, 12]SKb [d, f, 0.25, 0.1, 16]SKe [b, i, 0.13, 0.1, 22]SKb
[d, e, 0.25, 0.1, 18]SKd [d, i, 0.25, 0.1, 18]SKd
[i, e, 0.25, 0.1, 18]SKi [e, i, 0.25, 0.1, 18]SKe
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Table C.5: Final Data for scenario two, case three - hTrust.
a’s data b’s data c’s data
Aggregated Trust Informa-
tion
[a, b, 1, 1, 22] [b, a, 1, 1, 12] [c, a, 1, 1, 20]
[a, d, 0.65, 1, 20] [b, e, 0.34, 0.1, 12] [c, e, 0.34, 0.1, 14]
[c, f, 0.25, 0.1, 16]
[c, g, 0.25, 0.1, 20]
[c, h, 0.25, 0.1, 18]
Tacit Information [a, b, 1, 1, 12] [b, a, 0.97, 1, 12] [c, a, 0.99, 1, 14]
[a, c, 1, 1, 20] [c, e, 0.75, 0.1, 16]
[c, f, 0.75, 0.1, 18]
Portfolio of Credentials [b, a, 1, 1, 12]SKb [a, b, 1, 1, 12]SKa [a, c, 1, 1, 20]SKa
[c, a, 1, 1, 20]SKc [e, b, 0.4, 0.1, 12]SKe [e, c, 0.4, 0.1, 14]SKe
[f, c, 0.4, 0.1, 16]SKf
[g, c, 0.4, 0.1, 20]SKg
[h, c, 0.4, 0.1, 18]SKg
e’s data f ’s data g’s data
Aggregated Trust Informa-
tion
[e, b, 0.4, 0.1, 12] [f, c, 0.4, 0.1, 16] [g, c, 0.4, 0.1, 20]
[e, c, 0.4, 0.1, 14] [g, e, 1, 1, 12]
[e, g, 1, 1, 12]
Tacit Information [e, g, 0.97, 1, 12] [f, e, 1, 1, 12]
Portfolio of Credentials [b, e, 0.34, 0.1, 12]SKb [c, f, 0.25, 0.1, 16]SKc [c, g, 0.25, 0.1, 20]SKc
[c, e, 0.34, 0.1, 14]SKc [e, c, 0.4, 0.1, 14]SKe
[g, e, 1, 1, 12]SKg
h’s data
Aggregated Trust Informa-
tion
[h, c, 0.4, 0.1, 18]
Tacit Information (none)
Portfolio of Credentials [c, h, 0.25, 0.1, 18]SKc
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Table C.6: Final data for scenario two, case one - VTrust.
A’s data
(A → B) [0.33, 0.5, 0.0]
Trust value 0.83
B’s data
(B → A) [0.33, 0.5, 0.0]
Trust value 0.83
(B → E) [0.25, 0.13, 0.14]
Trust value 0.52
(B → G) [0.17, 0.12, 0.2]
Trust value 0.48
E’s data
(E → B) [0.25, 0.13, 0.2]
Trust value 0.58
(E → G) [0.5, 0.5, 0.0]
Trust value 1
G’s data
(G → B) [0.17, 0.13, 0.14]
Trust value 0.43
(G → E) [0.17, 0.5, 0.0]
Trust value 0.67
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Table C.7: Final data for scenario two, case two - VTrust.
A’s data B’s data
(A → B) [0.25, 0.5, 0.0] (B → A) [0.25, 0.5, 0.0]
Trust value 0.75 Trust value 0.75
(A → D) [0.13, 0.5, 0.0] (B → E) [0.15, 0.13, 0.14]
Trust value 0.63 Trust value 0.42
F ’s data I’s data
(F → D) [0.05, 0.14, 0.16] (I → D) [0.08, 0.14, 0.16]
Trust value 0.35 Trust value 0.37
(F → I) [0.05, 0.5, 0.0] (I → F ) [0.05, 0.5, 0.0]
Trust value 0.55 Trust value 0.55
D’s data E’s data
(D → A) [0.13, 0.5, 0.0] (E → B) [0.13, 0.13, 0.2]
Trust value 0.63 Trust value 0.45
(D → E) [0.13, 0.13, 0.14] (E → D) [0.13, 0.13, 0.2]
Trust value 0.39 Trust value 0.45
(D → F ) [0.5, 0.11, 0.15]
Trust value 0.31
(D → I) [0.08, 0.12, 0.16]
Trust value 0.35
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Table C.8: Final data for scenario two, case three - VTrust.
A’s data C’s data
(A → B) [0.13, 0.5, 0.0] (C → A) [0.21, 0.5, 0.0]
Trust value 0.63 Trust value 0.71
(A → C) [0.21, 0.5, 0.0] (C → E) [0.21, 0.13, 0.14]
Trust value 0.71 Trust value 0.47
B’s data
(B → A) [0.13, 0.5, 0.0] (C → F ) [0.13, 0.11, 0.16]
Trust value 0.63 Trust value 0.39
(B → E) [0.04, 0.13, 0.14] (C → H) [0.13, 0.12, 0.16]
Trust value 0.31 Trust value 0.4
(B → G) [0.04, 0.12, 0.2] (C → G) [0.13, 0.12, 0.0]
Trust value 0.36 Trust value 0.44
F ’s data G’s data
(F → E) [0.08, 0.5, 0.0] (G → E) [0.17, 0.5, 0.0]
Trust value 0.58 Trust value 0.67
(F → H) [0.13, 0.5, 0.0] (G → B) [0.04, 0.13, 0.14]
Trust value 0.63 Trust value 0.31
(F → C) [0.13, 0.14, 0.15] (G → C) [0.13, 0.13, 0.14]
Trust value 0.41 Trust value 0.39
E’s data H’s data
(E → B) [0.04, 0.13, 0.2] (H → F ) [0.13, 0.5, 0.0]
Trust value 0.37 Trust value 0.63
(E → G) [0.17, 0.5, 0.2] (H → C) [0.13, 0.14, 0.16]
Trust value 0.67 Trust value 0.42
(E → C) [0.21, 0.13, 0.2]
Trust value 0.53
(E → F ) [0.08, 0.5, 0.0]
Trust value 0.58
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Table C.9: Final data for scenario two, case one - P2P.
Pe’s data Pg’s data
Pe − Pb R(Pe, Pb) 0.0 Pg − Pe R(Pg, Pe) 1.0
T (Pe, Pb) 0.67 T (Pg, Pe) 0.75
Pe − Pg R(Pe, Pg) 1.0 Pg − Pb R(Pg, Pb) 0.0
T (Pe, Pg) 0.75 T (Pg, Pb) 0.37
Pb’s data Pa’s data
Pb − Pa R(Pb, Pa) 1.0 Pa − Pb R(Pa, Pb) 1.0
T (Pb, Pa) 0.75 T (Pa, Pb) 0.75
Pb − Pe R(Pb, Pe) 0.0
T (Pb, Pe) 0.33
Pb − Pg R(Pb, Pg) 0.0
T (Pb, Pg) 0.4
Table C.10: Final data for scenario two, case two - P2P.
Pa’s data Pb’s data
Pa − Pb R(Pa, Pb) 1.0 Pb − Pa R(Pb, Pa) 1.0
T (Pa, Pb) 0.75 T (Pb, Pa) 0.75
Pa − Pd R(Pa, Pd) 1.0 Pb − Pe R(Pb, Pe) 0.0
T (Pa, Pd) 0.75 T (Pb, Pe) 0.33
Pe’s data Pf ’s data
Pe − Pb R(Pe, Pb) 0.0 Pf − Pd R(Pf , Pd) 0.0
T (Pe, Pb) 0.33 T (Pf , Pd) 0.37
Pe − Pd R(Pe, Pd) 0.0 Pf − Pi R(Pf , Pi) 1.0
T (Pe, Pd) 0.33 T (Pf , Pi) 0.75
Pd’s data Pi’s data
Pd − Pa R(Pd, Pa) 1.0 Pi − Pd R(Pi, Pd) 0.0
T (Pd, Pa) 0.75 T (Pi, Pd) 0.37
Pd − Pe R(Pd, Pe) 0.0 Pi − Pf R(Pi, Pf ) 1.0
T (Pd, Pe) 0.33 T (Pi, Pf ) 0.75
Pd − Pf R(Pd, Pf ) 0.0
T (Pd, Pf ) 0.34
Pd − Pi R(Pd, Pi) 0.0
T (Pd, Pi) 0.36
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Table C.11: Final data for scenario two, case three - P2P.
Pa’s data Ph’s data
Pa − Pb R(Pa, Pb) 1.0 Ph − Pf R(Ph, Pf ) 1.0
T (Pa, Pb) 0.75 T (Ph, Pf ) 0.75
Pa − Pc R(Pa, Pc) 1.0 Ph − Pc R(Ph, Pc) 0.0
T (Pa, Pc) 0.75 T (Ph, Pc) 0.37
Pb’s data Pf ’s data
Pb − Pa R(Pb, Pa) 1.0 Pf − Pe R(Pf , Pe) 1.0
T (Pb, Pa) 0.75 T (Pf , Pe) 0.75
Pb − Pe R(Pb, Pe) 0.0 Pf − Ph R(Pf , Ph) 1.0
T (Pb, Pe) 0.33 T (Pf , Ph) 0.75
Pb − Pg R(Pb, Pg) 0.0 Pf − Pc R(Pf , Pc) 0.0
T (Pb, Pg) 0.33 T (Pf , Pc) 0.37
Pc’s data Pe’s data
Pc − Pa R(Pc, Pa) 1.0 Pe − Pb R(Pe, Pb) 0.0
T (Pc, Pa) 0.75 T (Pe, Pb) 0.33
Pc − Pe R(Pc, Pe) 0.0 Pe − Pg R(Pe, Pg) 1.0
T (Pc, Pe) 0.33 T (Pe, Pg) 0.75
Pc − Pf R(Pc, Pf ) 0.0 Pe − Pc R(Pe, Pc) 0.0
T (Pc, Pf ) 0.32 T (Pe, Pc) 0.23
Pc − Ph R(Pc, Ph) 0.0 Pe − Pf R(Pe, Pf ) 1.0
T (Pc, Ph) 0.33 T (Pe, Pf ) 0.75
Pc − Pg R(Pc, Pg) 0.0
T (Pc, Pg) 0.4
Pg’s data
Pg − Pe R(Pg, Pe) 1.0
T (Pg, Pe) 0.75
Pg − Pb R(Pg, Pb) 0.0
T (Pg, Pb) 0.33
Pg − Pc R(Pg, Pc) 0.0
T (Pg, Pc) 0.37
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